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Embraced in this study, is the content and structural approach on how corporate 
mergers and acquisitions should be planned and executed to facilitate post-acquisition 
synergies and improvement in customer service levels. 
The project covers Saambou bank post-acquisition business failure after take-over by 
First Rand Group, in a horizontal integration process that did not diversify or restructure 
product or service offerings between the two banks. There being no positive impact on 
post-acquisition market share and competition sustainability by the two banks, it implied 
that, the post-acquisition strategy did not adequately address the business risk factors 
that ultimately impaired the expected synergies of a take-over bid. 
Lack of proper post-acquisition business plan resulted in corporate failures pertaining to 
ineffective competitive strategies, non optimization of market and service levels, 
compounded by poor corporate governance resulting in the bank's internal control 
procedures and processes failing. Furthermore, poor customer service levels and 
transgression of the Bank's Usury Act regulations, rendered the organization more 
uncompetitive. 
The over-reliance on few large corporate customer deposits added a huge element of 
financial risk that marginalized Saambou bank's going concern prospects. Hence, upon 
experiencing few large corporate deposit withdrawals, for instance by Investec, resulting 
in the bank undergoing liquidity problems that resulted in it being placed under 
curatorship. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Problem Statement 
1.1 Background to the study 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been used as a tool for facilitating corporate 
external expansions through the control of shares and assets in another company, or by 
consolidating resources and operations to gain full and effective control of the market, 
undertake joint strategic opportunities and hedging against business risk (Thayser 
2002). The acquiring company performs a capital budgeting analysis to ensure that it will 
earn the required rate of return, and beyond that, special considerations for legal, tax, 
accounting and financial issues are brought into perspective when determining value 
that will be added. 
Thayser (2001) argues that, in the past, before South Africa was transformed politically 
and economically, the economy was in the control of few private sector companies and 
institutions that were in control of the majority of the market capitalization of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) Securities Exchange of South Africa, with Anglo 
American Corporation in control of the Forty percent market capitalization of the JSE. In 
the event of political transformation and post 1994 inception of democratic rule, the 
unbundling of big conglomerates was undertaken in order to marginalize their huge level 
of stake holding in the JSE and accord other companies and the newly emerging Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) companies some participation in the stock market. This 
was evidenced through the unbundling of large consortiums. 
The acquisition by Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) consortiums of entities within 
the Anglo American group, such as Johnnie and the Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investments (JCI) in the wake, led to black emerging business participation in the 
country's economy by awarding them stakes in big conglomerates via the M&A process, 
and giving companies access to public capital. 
In the event of this string of emerging acquisitions, during the past few years, BEE 
control of the JSE rose to eight percent control of market capitalization with the trend 
continuing to increase despite failure to grow and winding up of some of the BEE 
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companies in the JSE, examples being, the downsizing and failure of companies such 
as JCI, Nail and shut down of Molope (Services and Facilities) Group. 
M&As are an integral part of South African corporate life, and it is therefore relevant for 
us to analyze the reasons for failure in M&A's, and how to set the terms for a successful 
merger or acquisition. Also, as part of due diligence, how these terms get wrongly 
applied or misjudged in the event of a business deal coming to failure. 
In summary, mergers and acquisitions are primarily aimed at facilitating corporate 
expansions, allow for market dominance and business risk diversification (Brews, 1987). 
M&As are motivated by the desire to acquire more opportunities that the acquiring 
company does not posses in full or in part through direct or indirect participation in the 
acquired business. Failure attributable to any of the opportunities driving the business 
acquisition decision, can result in an investment becoming non-viable and failing to 
realize expected synergies for maximizing post-acquisition returns (Correia et al., 1993). 
Reasons for mergers and acquisitions, according to Correia ef al., (1993:666), are the 
following: 
Operating economies, managerial skills, tax considerations - assessed losses, use of 
excess liquidity, diversification, lower Financing costs, replacement costs and technology 
integration. Some of these factors are explained in this research context where deemed 
relevant to the content of this research. 
1.2 Motivation for Research 
The need to contribute some analytical thinking and critical judgement towards the study 
on maximization of corporate returns through diversification of investment risk, to enable 
the spread of risk between diversified business interests has been the key motivator for 
this study on M&As. 
According to Affleck-Graves et al., (1988), the problem associated with failure to achieve 
the above-mentioned motivation is mainly attributed to companies looking forward to 
investing surplus capital without adequately evaluating the potential financial and 
technical viability of future business activities that lie ahead of their target companies. 
2 
Most organizations invest without having under-gone sufficient due diligence in order to 
gain full know-how of the business they wish to embark on. According to Thayser 
(2003:103), an insufficient coverage is dangerous, as acquirers do wipe more value of 
the market capitalization through failures in due diligence. 
Lack of proper feeding of due diligence into the business plans, has seen the collapse of 
most businesses after the M&A process. For novice acquirers, a due diligence is just an 
information gathering process, they usually do not begin to formulate strategy and build 
a valuation model until the process is complete, and hence fail to link their due diligence 
closely to business planning. 
1.3 Purpose of study 
The purpose of this study is to establish reasons linked to post-acquisition failure in M&A 
deals, to establish how these failures develop, and to find best possible means and 
outcome of planning and structuring an optimum due-diligence approach, prior to 
negotiating a deal with other parties to the transaction. The purpose above has been 
conveyed in a checklist of guidelines and procedures for an optimum due diligence 
approach, available from http://www.woodbridqeqrp.com/corporate revitalization.html. 
The research is aimed at establishing a formal approach and checklist of events that 
should be covered in performing a due diligence exercise, an example used in this 
research case study is that of a post-acquisition failure of Saambou bank, after being 
acquired by First Rand Group. It highlights the lack of attention on key areas that would 
have been vital in setting a viable post-acquisition business strategy that would enhance 
the expected synergies that motivated the acquisition, hence leading to post acquisition 
failure of the bank. 
The study also explores the nature of investment risks associated with M&As. These 
risks can render less synergies in a deal, from the point of pre-acquisition, where value 
of the target entity is being negotiated, and on post-acquisition business performance 




The limiting factors on this study are due to the fact that the research exercise was 
based on an entity that no longer exists, and for which part of the information necessary 
for executing this project is still perceived confidential and not being made available for 
public consumption, namely the Curator's liquidation report by Mr John Louw, of Audit 
firm KPMG. Hence, no contact, or information could be availed for this purpose by the 
former employees of the liquidated bank cited in the case study below. 
Saambou bank, being the first banking group to be forced to close down due to 
customer reactions in connection with negative sentiments concerning its governance, 
and on the basis of liquidity problems inherent from extreme cash withdrawals by 
depositors, resulted in the study having no comparative terms of reference. 
1.5 Significance of study 
The relevance of this study is pertinent in the investment banking sector, and to 
corporate investment managers looking forward to making key strategic corporate 
investment decisions. Factors outlined below, are elaborated further in this study, for the 
purpose of assisting readers about an optimal approach to be followed when embarking 
and concluding on a M&A deal. 
Answers must be obtained to the following questions when evaluating a deal for 
acquisition (Affleck-Graves era/., 1988). 
• How to evaluate the inherent risks within the target company for acquisition? 
• What makes the target company render synergies in an acquisition? 
• How to evaluate and deliver synergies as part of the post acquisition business 
plan? 
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1.6 Research Questions 
This study attempts to answer the following questions: 
• What are the main reasons motivating M&A deals in the corporate investment 
environment? 
• What are the expected post-acquisition synergies, inherent from a deal? 
• What are the critical factors often over-looked when evaluating a transaction? 
• How do target companies fail with regard to re-alignment of their systems and 
controls for proper governance and competitiveness, subsequent to a deal? 
1.7 Objectives of the study 
The purpose of this exercise is to determine the reason why companies invest their 
resources on others, the types and impact of risk associated with that, and how risk 
should be identified and managed prior and after concluding a M&A deal. In order to 
achieve the purpose of this study, the following objectives are set for this study: 
• To determine reasons leading to M&A, and to what extent these reasons can be 
compatible to the acquiring company's type of business and objectives. 
• To determine how risk should be evaluated as part of the due-diligence exercise. 
• To determine how business valuation of the acquired or merging companies 
should be quantified based on inherent risks and perceived synergies. 
• To determine how strategies to the above objectives can be measured and 
managed in the post-acquisition business plan. 
1.8 Structure of the study 
The study has been outlined and structured in the following manner: 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
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Embraces the context of the study, statement of goals, the scope and significance as 
well as limitations, which are all outlined above. These factors elaborate on the purpose 
and objectives of this study, which are embraced in the above-mentioned research 
questions. 
Chapter 2 - Review of related Literature 
Theory of the study, which incorporates the general principles underlying a M&A deal, 
synergies encompassed in a M&A deal, reference is made to examples outlined in the 
Capital Alliance Group of Companies Review of Operations, which is fully outlined in 
Appendix 2. 
Chapter 3 - Research Methodology 
Outlines the approach used in gathering information for this study, tools used to gather 
information and methods used to analyze it. Qualitative means of obtaining information 
were used, which amongst others, include, considerations outlined by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), as follows: 
• Literature review 
• Data collection 
• Data population 
• Data analysis 
Chapter 4 - Case Study 
Case study is on Saambou bank's business history, which outlines the outcome from its 
governance processes and business procedures, which determined the quality of its 
service levels and effectiveness of its service delivery. The Saambou bank example best 
is most suitable for the purpose of this study as it outlines some causes that can lead to 
post-acquisition failures in M&A deals. 
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Chapter 5 - Evaluation of the case 
Critical evaluation of the case study results, using the Porters five forces, analysis of 
strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) that faced the business, as 
well as the political, economic, social and technological (PEST) factors. 
The above approach results in the analysis of the case a study, obtained through 
literature reviews and data population. 
Chapter 6 - Recommendations and Conclusion 
Analytical review and conclusions drawn from the entire analysis of text and readings 
generated in this study, and of the case example cited to explain the purpose of this 
research. The underlying factors and conclusions are structured to critically contribute to 
organizational decisions for corporate investment and planning in future M&A deals. 
The following chapter embraces general theory to explain the reasons motivating 
business acquisitions and mergers for corporate maximization of wealth, through 
exploitation of industry opportunities by means of risk diversification through vertical and 
horizontal business integrations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Background factors to the problem 
While a lot of acquisitions and mergers have taken place in South Africa, there has been 
an assortment of outcomes following these deals (Thayser, 2002). 
Hence, for those that failed to achieve the objective, there is a need to establish causes 
for failure in order to devise a checklist of procedures and rules that must be followed 
when evaluating the business prior to deciding whether to buy or merge, in valuing the 
deal and integration strategies that can enhance synergies. 
Reasons leading to synergies in a merger and acquisition deal can be overstated with 
the intent to come up with an attractive value for the deal, or to render a good impression 
to facilitate the deal to go ahead without an adequate feasibility study on the 
achievement of cited reasons for merger or acquisition. The overstating or non-
consideration of all reasons that should be considered for evaluation as part of due 
diligence has led to failure of merged and acquired enterprises (Dodd, 1980). 
The projected outcome of all reasons leading to a M&A determine the outcome of value 
for the deal. As argued by Kitching (1967), in a valuation exercise, a set of financial 
ratios based on future cash flow projections for post acquisition results will form a basis 
for decision making on whether to merge or acquire, and also the weighing and 
benchmarking of these ratios to industry averages and opportunity cost of forgone 
alternatives will contribute to the decision on whether to buy, and determine value for 
negotiations. Therefore, it is evident that misleading due diligence performance leading 
to inaccurate cash flow forecasts can result in wrong investment decisions, that can lead 
to failure in achieving expected post merger results and returns (Rappaport, 1979). 
Companies merge or acquire each other to take advantage of each other's existing 
resources and ensure their maximum capacity utilization. 
Instead of a company developing its own resource or asset base, it can opt to merge or 
take over another entity in order to make full use of existing resources and render 
economies of scale benefits (Affleck-Graves ef a/., 1988). 
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Kitching (2001) argues that, in some cases, companies may opt to merge in order to 
make use of benefits of large scale economies, only to find that the realization of such 
benefits is made unrealistic as a result of the market circumstances in a case of a 
matured or saturated market, with constant or declining market shares and not 
facilitating this purpose in the event of a merger or acquisition being entered into. A good 
example is the delayed investment and reluctance by big strategic players in the world 
fixed line telecommunications to invest in the South African Second Network Operator 
due to the phasing out of the fixed line telecomm market and its market dominance by 
Telkom. 
Large firms are chasing managerial skills. Conversely, from a different perspective, a 
large firm may decide that it needs the managerial skills found in a smaller firm. This was 
the purported reason why Nedbank acquired Finansbank, (Correia at al., 1993). A large 
conglomerate may acquire a small one in the interest of acquiring skills and knowledge 
inherent in it, and not for the purpose of facilitating business expansion as such. The 
outcome will still be perceived as a failure if the acquired business is winded up following 
the acquisition. 
In some cases, mergers and acquisitions are embarked upon for sole purposes of tax 
considerations. Where the acquiring company can set out good economic reasons for 
the merger, the set-off of future income of the target company against the assessed loss 
of the merger partner will be allowed. 
However, if the Receiver of Revenue can establish that the change in shareholding has 
been effected solely or mainly for the purpose of utilizing any assessed loss in order to 
avoid taxes, the Receiver will disallow the set-off of future income against pre-merger 
assessed losses and this will eliminate any expected benefits that encouraged the M&A 
decision and change the outcome of post-merger forecasted financial performance to 
the detriment (Mandelker, 1974). 
Use of excess liquidity by companies is another cause for acquisitions. On the other 
hand, a company may take over another firm in order to obtain the benefits of its strong 
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liquid asset base, which may result in surplus funds for increased level of returns in the 
event of tight monetary recession (Correia etal., 1993). 
Diversification is often cited as a reason for M&A, as cited by Barr and van den Honert, 
(1988). A company in a particular business field may decide to enter into an unrelated 
business area. In so doing, it obtains the benefits of diversification if there is no perfect 
positive correlation between the returns of the two sectors, thereby reducing the 
variability of its returns. Portfolio risk in some cases render the level of risks above the 
expected returns, and can result in the investment not being financial viable. 
The gearing effect of the post M&A deal can lead to the failure of companies due to the 
inherent high financial risk and poor management of liquidity. For example, the merged 
company may result in improved credit rating than before, when companies were 
operating as separate entities. The merged company may decide to make full use of its 
improved credit rating on capital projects with feasibility of earning positive returns. 
Some companies opt for the acquisition of another company if the market value placed 
on its acquisition is substantially below that of the replacement cost of the required 
assets. This is mainly a short-term view of cash savings, whilst the long-term view is 
focused on realizing the value of inherent synergies from operating activities of the 
merged or acquired business (Bhana, 1983). 
Mergers and acquisitions are sometimes decided on firms wanting to take an opportunity 
on full use of technological resources and skills of another or target entity. Technology 
changes rapidly, and new advanced technology outperforms the old version. 
Different technologies can differentiate quality of products and services and immediately 
divert consumer focus and perception on the product. Firms decide to merge on grounds 
of using the technological expertise and resources of target company. In the event of 
technology advancing in the short-term, the expected benefits out of this technology 
base collapse and the investment for the merger becomes worthless as more costly 
capital will be required for re-investment to make the new business remain competitive. 
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As argued by Bhana (1983), setting the merger or acquisition price is an exercise based 
on the probability of returns, with assumptions made turning out to be acceptable by all 
parties to the value negotiations. Based on this uncertainty, there is a possibility that the 
price can be overstated, and based on the overstated cost of investment, future returns 
may fall below the expected level of returns marginalized by the over pricing of the deal. 
If the valuation of the deal is prudent, proper decision can be made and best investment 
alternatives taken. 
The publication cited in the website http://www.woodbridqeqrp.com/business 
valuations.htm, states that business valuation is subjective and unique to the 
circumstances of each business. A potential buyer will place little credibility in a value 
arrived at by an owner's accountant. A properly prepared valuation report by an 
independent valuation expert is the best tool you can use to obtain the maximum selling 
price. The agreed price will be dependent on the negotiations and bargaining terms of 
the negotiating parties to the agreement. 
The merger or acquisition is intended to result in synergistic benefits, which implies that 
the sum of forecasted post-M&A returns is more than the sum of pre-M&A returns of the 
two companies combined (Brews, 1987). 
As pointed out by van den Honert et al., (1989), in light of the above, monetary outcome 
of projected figures could be misleading. For example, the post merger or acquisition 
returns in total can exceed sum of returns prior to the deal, but only to find that, due to 
the capital structure inherent in business after the deal, the merger or acquisition 
financed through the issue of share capital has a high cost of capital associated with it, 
thereby, also diluting the post-M&A earnings per share (EPS). 
While financing through debt could be cheaper but increase the financial risk, and 
distorting the credit ratings of the new business by reducing interest cover ratio and 
increasing gearing ratio. The best optimal structural finance deal that will optimize the 
weighted average cost of capital and facilitate improvement in returns as part of the deal 
to unlock synergies must be established and implemented (van den Honert et al., 1989). 
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There are dazzling varieties of reasons leading to M&A. Their projected evaluated 
outcomes through the due diligence exercise have a direct impact in the valuation 
exercise of the two companies in the event of a merger, or the target company in the 
event of an acquisition. In case of failure to accurately project the outcome of these 
reasons, or the post implementation strategy not being effective and efficient to ensure 
accomplishment of expected results, failure of the merger or acquisition is probable 
under such circumstances. 
2.2 Assumptions 
Below, are the assumed key reasons for failure of M&A, according to Kitching (2001), 
poor business judgement pertaining to anticipated synergies can lead to the 
overpayment of target company. In addition to this pre-M&A misjudgments, failure to 
M&A can also be attributable to the wrong planning of M&A post-integration processes, 
as argued by Owens and Scott (1990), rather than failure owing to business operations. 
Another reason that M&As fail is due to insufficient attention paid in order to make the 
deal work after the transaction has been concluded. Often, the deal is negotiated at 
senior executive level, where the focus is mostly strategic, and then the implementation 
is left to the immediate lower level of management. What often transpires is that, this 
lower level of management may not share the same vision with that of senior executive 
level which drew the post integration business plan, and as a result they may end up not 
being in tune the critical steps that need to be taken to unlock the anticipated value. 
One classical example in South Africa was the demise of the small bank, Saambou bank 
in 2002. This model prompted the long expected consolidation in the financial sector. 
Disappearing from the scene were historic stalwarts BoE, Saambou and PSG 
Investment Bank. Much of the activity in the financial sector was prompted by the failure 
of smaller banks such as Saambou, Unifer and BoE. The implication is that, size and 
intent to grow and dominate the industry sector are some of the reasons leading to M&A. 
If these reasons are not diligently handled, or market forces do not permit survival of 
smaller players, this can result in failure in M&A. The South African small bank model 
discussed above is a classical example. It is argued that the run on deposits 
experienced by a number of small banks, led to their liquidation (Thayser, 2002). 
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The key motive behind M&As is expansion of the existing market base and creation of 
wealth through acquisition of smaller role players who can add to this benefit. However, 
lack of proper post acquisition strategies could see the acquisition purpose not being 
realized. 
For example, in the past, the reason for South African larger banks to acquire smaller 
banks was to take opportunity to grab the imminent arrival of the Community 
Reinvestment Bill. This bill was arranged through the Government for small banks to 
provide larger amount of housing finance to lower income household. With large banks 
move to indirectly participate in this market opportunity, the acquisition for smaller banks 
by the large banks was then intensified (Thayser, 2001). 
Banks make a profit by undertaking a calculated financial risk, where depositors money 
(secured liabilities) is used to raise banks assets (not fully secured). If post acquisition 
strategies do not adequately focus on proper management inherent financial risk, 
external environmental factors, including market perceptions about the business can 
lead to business failure. 
Using the financial services sector as an example of risk assessment, Mueller (1977) 
argues that, banks going concern prospects are dependent on certain liquidity 
thresholds being attained. Without minimum liquidity thresholds, a bank's continuity is 
much under threat. Hence, to attain the required liquid capital mix, the bank's assets are 
to a great extent funded by risk free liabilities, thereby, increasing the inherent business 
financial. 
Since, the banking sector comprises of high competition, brand image and customer 
loyalty is the key to business continuity. Hence, smaller banks experienced problems in 
South Africa as a result of their marginal reputation and lack of brand image on their 
service offerings. In the foregoing, M&As by larger banking groups was adopted to 
enhance the survival of smaller banks through the image and customer confidence 
brought in by acquiring banks, and for market growth out of synergies brought in by 
bigger acquiring or merging banks. 
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Lack of a commercially viable post-acquisition strategy, can render expected synergies 
worthless. Due to intense competition in the banking sector, service offerings to the 
public should be streamlined to motivate customers to stay with the bank. Service 
offering incentives, coupled with strategic focus on marketing and promotions are key 
strategies for competitiveness (Mueller, 1977). 
The cost of delivering the marketing strategy and rendering services much more 
convenient to the public must be matched with returns achievable from high risk asset 
base of the institution, as cited by Mandelker (1974). In other words, deposits and other 
risk-free investments with the bank must be at certain capacity level to ensure 
economies of scale returns to recover all costs necessary to give the institution a going 
concern and warrant expected returns to investors, whilst at the same time, the results 
must portray good image to the public for the sake of giving it confidence for trading its 
stock/shares favourably in the stock market, and to encourage new depositors (Graves, 
Flach and Jacobson, 1988). 
The demise that faced most of South African small banks that were acquired by larger 
banks, was dependent on their poor post-acquisition strategies that did not adequately 
focus on post acquisition events and how best to optimize them. One relevant example, 
is on the acquisition of Saambou bank by First Rand Group, for which the motive for the 
acquisition was on the synergistic benefits inherent from the Community Reinvestment 
Bill arranged through the Government for small banks to provide larger amount of 
housing finance to poor and lower income household groups (Thayser, 2002). 
In a financial institution like Saambou bank, where acquisition by First Rand Group was 
driven by an opportunity from one service offering, amongst other service offerings, can 
pose a risk significant to render the whole deal to failure. In other words, a sensitivity 
analysis comparing the varying risk levels inherent in the relationship and timing of the 
bank's assets and liabilities was overlooked, and hence resulting in poor match of 
liquidity in the bank's balance sheet (Mandelker, 1974). 
Commercial Bank's are highly geared institutions. The timing of assets and liabilities in 
their balance sheets is not consistent. In most cases, their capital structure comprises of 
insignificant equity funding, and mainly of long and short-term money market loans. The 
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latter includes investors' deposits, which are withdrawn at call. These are high-risk 
liabilities with full obligation to honour withdrawals and cost of capital. Whilst, on the 
other hand, the assets funded by this capital base are exposed to risk, subject to 
payment default by borrowers. 
According to an interview with Dave Thayser, partner at Ernst & Young Corporate 
Finance, he says the deal may look great on paper (deal looking impressive due to an 
existing opportunity to expand, ignoring other unforeseeable risk factors - due to lack of 
adequate sensitivity analysis to cover all possible risks). The ultimate success of the 
deal is dependent upon a successful integration process. The key to successful 
integration is developing an effective strategic integration plan, and the first step in 
developing this plan is through evaluation of possible business alternatives that will 
constitute the post-acquisition plan. 
The main goal motivating M&As is on securing market growth, and drive towards 
inheriting the synergies rendered by the economies of scale from integrated operations. 
As earlier mentioned, core benefits resulting in synergies are focused on, securing 
market expansion and dominance, procure competitors management skills and 
expertise, diversification of business risk through investment portfolio acquisitions, spare 
capacity utilization for cost effectiveness and enhanced efficiency, tax benefits and 
avoidance, through combined assessed losses at acquisition, and technology integration 
and development (Correia, et. a/., 1993). 
The benefits mentioned above, serve as reasons for acquisition cited by Life Assurance 
companies under Capital Alliance in Appendix 2, which are focused at streamlining and 
optimizing operations to achieve improvement in service delivery, through more efficient 
and cost effective approach to operations, whilst still maintaining best customer service 
by fulfilling and complying with changing customer needs and market preferences ahead 
of its competitors. 
The MSN Web Page Home Results on Capital Alliance acquisition of Life Assurance 
companies explain the expected synergies from a merger and acquisition, as outlined 
below. 
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With reference to Appendix 2, it is noted that, the following synergies are expected out of 
a M&A deal, which were realized by Capital Alliance under review of its operations. 
Improvement in Customer Service Levels, as service level turnaround times were 
optimized, due to enhanced efficiencies and cost savings from integrated projects. As 
per Table 1 ,and Graph 1. 
Demonstrated by the reduced number of work flow in queues between January 2001 
and January 2003 after acquisitions and integration of Fedlife projects into Capital 
Alliance operations. 
Efficiencies from integration of acquired projects were also experienced from 
improvement in Call Centre statistics, mainly the response time for calls, reduction in 
number of abandoned calls, and less average talk time, coupled by re-enforcement of 
the culture of cost effectiveness. As per Table 2, and Graph 2. 
The completion of various integration of projects (merged projects) resulted in overall 
reduction of costs and increased volume of policies administered and reduction in 
administration average cost per unit of policy. 
Another factor that creates a host of unforeseen complications at point of M&A deal, 
which results in the deal losing its potential value perceived from the due diligence point 
of view, is the lack of identification of all embedded value factors for the new business, 
which undermines the expected synergies inherent from the deal (Jensen, 1984). 
Lack of post acquisition strategy on addressing the embedded value factors which can 
be overlooked at acquisition point, can lead to poor governance being experienced 
moving way forward. The lack of focus in planning for systems integration like financial 
and operating software/ERP systems resulted in control weaknesses which led to many 
post-M&A failures. 
According to Devine (2002), Michael Porter, a strategy guru at Harvard Business School, 
puts his finger on the unique nature of M&As when he declares : 
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"There is a tremendous allure to M&As. It's the big play, the dramatic gesture. With the 
stroke of a pen, you can add billions to size, get a front page story and create excitement 
in the market. M&A can disrupt business performance, often damage profits over the 
short term, distract the management and, ultimately, add little or nothing to the book 
value of the acquired or new business". 
For example, as per research conducted by Anderson on media and communications 
sector, respondents cited people-based problems contributing to failure, such as the 
length of time taken by management to adapt, failure to integrate new technology 
because of "not invented here" mentality, poor cultural integration and the failure to 
retain key people. Respondents on this survey highlighted the following as reasons for 
post acquisition problems, the lack of an executive champion, an unclear strategy, poor 
executive alignment and a failure to involve major stakeholders. 
Hence, lack of an optimal business plan and post acquisition strategy on integrating 
systems and controls for corporate governance, and in ensuring optimal use of 
underlying resources to promote business efficiency and effectiveness can render the 
target company's customer service ratings to decline (Van den Honert er a/., (1988). 
To validate the above theoretical review on M&As, and to support the research 
motivation, the following chapter sets the criteria for the method and approach to obtain 
qualitative information for investigation and analysis of the gathered data for the purpose 
of this study. 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This study is of a descriptive qualitative nature, with a case study analysis pertaining to 
in depth description of organizational behaviours influencing M&A activity, and known 
reasons for failures thereon. 
A descriptive study attempts to describe or define a subject, often by creating a profile of 
a group of problems, people, or events as encapsulated in a case study situation in 
chapter four below (Cooper and Schindler 2003). 
The purpose of this research was to establish reasons that lead to corporate post-
acquisition failures as a result of poor planning around the due diligence process 
following a decision to invest or merge businesses for the purpose of managing 
operational and investment risks. 
3.2 Research Methods 
The proposed research incorporated a range of methodologies, similar to the approach 
adopted by Krairit (2001). 
3.2.1 Research Methodology 1: Literature Review 
Reference was made to M&A annual review of activity publications edited by David 
Thayser, Partner at Ernst & Young accounting and auditing firm, and intensive search 
through websites on Saambou bank's history, as well as reference on other publication 
journals and texts on M&A activity. 
3.2.2 Research Methodology 2: Interviews 
In order to validate the assumptions inherent from the evaluation of the case study 
example, interviews were conducted with selected individuals to acquire generic 
knowledge on M&A activity, and to make use of their experience and ideas generated 
from the interviews in the analysis and evaluation of the case study below. The 
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interviews were open-ended and assumed a conversational manner, but followed a set 
of questions based on the list in Appendix 1. 
Interviews in particular, were held with David Thayser of Ernst & Young, and Harry 
Kelan, Senior Manager- Corporate Investments and Acquisitons - of Investment Bank, 
Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). This interviews were generic on the 
topic, with examples used pertaining to the organization used in the case study example. 
3.2.3 Research Methodology 3: Data Collection 
Appendix 2, relates to some of the inherent synergies expected out of a M&A 
subsequent to a deal. Reference was made to capital Alliance review of M&A 
operations. This was used for re-alignment and comparison to findings out of the 
Saambou bank's case study research, in order to facilitate data analysis and conclusive 
guidelines to aid future users of this exercise when entering into transaction deals of 
similar nature. 
Sources of data collection: 
• Reference to websites on M&A activities relating to Saambou bank, and on other 
business corporates for information re-alignment and guidelines on way forward 
for future deals. 
• Textual reference on M&A activity 
• Focused interviews with relevant parties in the corporate investment sector 
3.2.4 Research Methodology 4: Data Population 
The inherent difficulty in populating this exercise is that, at the time of conducting the 
research, the entity was placed on liquidation, and the scope of the research further 
limited by the fact that the KPMG's curator's report, Mr John Louw, is not yet made 
public. 
The intention of this exercise, was not to evaluate the investment risk specific to one 
entity, but to set a framework and reference guidelines in optimizing investment 
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decisions to be made in future acquisitions within the financial sector. A case study 
reference on Saambou bank in chapter four outlines the operational and financial risk 
factors inherent in an acquisition, and the population and analysis thereof used for 
evaluating in case study evaluation in chapter five. 
Critical information regarding the negotiations that were put forward when striking the 
deal between Saambou bank and First Rand, and the information on the bank's curator 
ship were not made public or made available on the bank's website. 
3.2.5 Research Methodology 5: Data Analysis 
The analysis progressed in three phases, first the introduction, which outlined the 
generic purposes from a micro to macro economic perspective of entering into M&As, 
the literature review for outlining facts and reasons why M&A exist, and finally the case 
study approach which outlined specific facts around Saambou bank's acquisition failure. 
Information gathering for this exercise is through a case study analysis of Saambou 
bank's acquisition by First Rand Limited, to provide an in-depth description of factors 
involved in organizational approach in handling strategic corporate investment decisions, 
as outlined later in the case study. 
Tools used for analysis of the case study, and for compilation of recommendations 
moving forward for the benefit of users of this study, were based on the following 
techniques, Porters five forces, SWOT analysis, and PEST analysis. 
Lastly, elite interviews were conducted from industry experts as an attempt to establish 
their interpretation of the key issues, and the impact of their assessment of M&A activity 
in relation to corporate investment synergies. The data was documented using standard 
interview questions outlined in appendixl, and the researcher then tried to prioritize and 
rank some of the key issues of concerns raised, as well as illicit common views 
emerging from the various phases of analysis. 
20 
The above-mentioned methodologies were made applicable for obtaining relevant data, 
investigating and analyzing the case study data used in this exercise. 
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Chapter 4: Case Study 
4.1 Introduction 
The case study covers pre and post-acquisition activities leading to organisational 
failures in corporate governance for the Saambou bank, following its acquisition by First 
Rand Limited. 
The case below analyses corporate investment risk factors leading to post-acquisition 
failures, key risk elements embraced in the case study include the following: 
> Financial risk inherent from the Balance sheet capital structure 
> No product/service diversity 
> No effect in the market - no economies of scale to raise market competitiveness 
> No post acquisition systems and processes re-engineering to enhance internal 
control efficiencies 
The above-mentioned risks can therefore be interpreted in the case below which was 
referred to the Tribunal by the Competition Board during the process of the business 
acquisition, as published on website http://www.fnb.co.za/saambou/fnb/relationship.htm 
4.2 Case - Tribunal Hearing 
First Rand Bank holdings Ltd vs. Saambou Bank Ltd 
This transaction, which involves firms, which are both in the banking industry, will 
be effected by way of scheme of arrangement ('the scheme") that was proposed 
by First Rand Bank. In terms of this scheme First Rand Bank will acquire the 
entire issued share capital and certain claims of Saambou Bank from Saambou 
Holdings. In terms of the scheme, certain assets will remain vested in and under 
the control of Saambou Bank. On completion of the transaction First Rand will 
control the deposits valued at R12, 751 billion and the mortage book, valued at 
R4, 878 billion. 
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The Commission found that this merger is not likely to prevent or substantially 
lessen competition and recommended to the Tribunal that the transaction be 
approved without conditions for the following reasons: 
Although the market shares for the parties will be above 15%, they are not likely 
to raise competition concerns, as there are other big financial institutions, which 
are competing with the merging firms. These big financial institutions are likely to 
discipline price should the merged entity attempt to increase their prices above 
competitive level. In addition, this transaction does not raise significant public 
interest concerns. 
4.3 Tribunal Hearing Judgement and Outcome 
The outcome of the above case implies that the acquisition by First Rand did not take 
the financial risk implications into account. The Balance Sheet structure of Saambou 
comprised more of secured debt, and less long and short -term investment assets. 
4.4 Inherent Corporate Financial Risk 
The timing of assets and liabilities lacked proper balancing, and compounded further by 
the huge gearing level inherent in Saambou capital structure. 
Due to high gearing, the main source of funding for investment assets (loans) was more 
from customer deposits, which were payable at call, whilst investment assets were 
unsecured and recoverable at differing time frames, and hence increasing the liquidity 
risk and incidental shortfalls on cash flow due to timing imbalance between assets and 
liabilities (esp on working capital). 
4.5 Due Diligence Risk Factors (not adequately addressed in the acquisition 
deal) 
Also, the acquisition did not enhance any growth in product lines or service offerings, 
and had no value add on existing revenue streams for the two banking sectors, apart 
from the fact that it was motivated by the government's market offer of low income 
subsidized housing schemes for civil servants to Saambou bank. This opportunity, 
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however got overwritten by the mismanagement of the capital structure and timing of 
cash flows inherent from Saambou's Balance Sheet. 
The above, implies that, due to the Tribunal's statement when deciding the above case, 
lack of competitive force from the acquisition rendered no economies of scale benefits 
as the trading volumes in Saambou remained at original levels even after the acquisition, 
before incidentally dropping with the eventual collapse of the business from loss of 
customer confidence following post acquisition downfalls on systems and processes. 
Hence, no added benefits in terms of reduction in average cost levels and no 
improvement in operating profit margins. Hence, the Tribunal citing the fact that, due to 
lack of competitiveness evident from the acquisition, the acquisition will have no force to 
control the deregulated pricing in the market, as other big institutions which will not be 
affected by the acquisition will have the ability to step in and correct the pricing in a 
much competitive way. 
Lack of economies, and no proper investment and post strategy viability test before 
deciding on the acquisition, have rendered the above deficiencies and mismanagement 
problems in this acquisition. 
Below, is the case study detailing the culture and operational activities that were inherent 
in Saambou Bank pre and post acquisition by First Rand, and the implications thereof for 
inherent operational and financial risks that ought to have been addressed in the post 
acquisition strategy to alleviate the weaknesses that led to post acquisition corporate 
failure. 
It is thereby proven by this case that, First Rand motive for the acquisition was to create 
more market and wider customer and diversity of customer service range, without 
considering in their post acquisition plan the strategies to make full use of synergies 
available as part of the operational plan moving forward. 
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4.6 Case Study Content 
HOW SAAMBOU BANK OVERCHARGED BONDHOLDERS AND FIRSTRAND 
CONTINUES WITH THE RIP OFF. 
The content of the extract outlined below, was published from the following website, 
http:// www.bankqate.co.za/How FNB continues to rip off Saambou bank 
bondholders.htm 
When First Rand obtained the mortgage book of Saambou, they were informed by the 
Registrar of the Usury Act to rectify all mortgage bonds where the illegal advance 
interest calculation was applied. However, the bank never adjusted the overstated 
balances of Saambou bondholders and is currently still levying interest on the inflated 
balances and is presently recovering millions of rands from prejudice Saambou 
bondholders in unearned interest. This is a contravention of section 5(1) & 5(1 )(c) of the 
Usury Act, which is a criminal offence. Hence, inefficiencies of this kind become public 
knowledge especially in the case of public companies, mainly because their audit report 
get publicized, and findings like this resulted in Saambou loosing its grip as a result of 
poor corporate image in the perspective of its customers and the public in general. 
This issue of corporate inefficiencies, got spread to the market, and as a result the 
response was a sharp drop in the Saambou stocks in the JSE, sending bad investor, 
customer and public perceptions which led to secondary market selling of bank shares 
and customer deposit withdrawal which left the bank illiquid, and causing its demise. 
Saambou Bank ignored a 1990 warning from the Reserve Bank that interest may not be 
calculated in advance without the necessary adjustment of interest payable in respect of 
payments received, but continued with this unlawful practice until September 1999. 
It is estimated that the amount overcharged by the bank could be as high as R5-billion, 
an amount Treasury has to pay after the Reserve Bank agreed to provide liquidity 
support i.e. the taxpayers will foot the bill. 
This is how SAAMBOU defaulted:-
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Saambou Bank calculated interest in advance for the following month, on the 
outstanding balance one day preceding payment date, which was the first day of every 
month. The Usury Act determines that interest should be calculated at the end of the 
period i.e. payment date. Furthermore, whenever any payment was received during the 
month, Saambou Bank did not make any credit interest adjustment in respect of the 
payment received. 
The above, resulting in over-statement of the Balance sheet value of business or its net 
assets, due to unearned interest revenues forming part of the business net worth. 
Hence, from a due diligence and valuation stage preceding the take over of the bank by 
First Rand, it implies the probability that First Rand overpaid for Saambou on the basis 
of over-stated working capital assets, and wrong valuation resulting in overpayment in 
the cost of investment, which understated future returns on investment for the acquired 
business. This implies one reason for post acquisition failure, when returns were 
marginal when benchmarked to market returns. 
On 30 May 2000, the Commercial Crime Unit tasked forensic auditor, Gregory Johnson 
to investigate the mortgage bond of Saambou for contraventions of the Usury Act. The 
bond was registered in December 1990 for an amount of R 123 000 and repayable over 
a term of 20 years. 
In his affidavit submitted to the Commercial Crime Unit dated 12 September 2000, 
Johnson explained the effect between calculating interest in advance and interest in 
arrears as follows:-
"Where interest is calculated in arrears, the loan will be repaid within nineteen and a half 
years. Where interest is calculated in advance [the method Saambou used], the loan will 
never be repaid. In fact, after 20 years, the balance increases from the initial amount to 
R 133 960.00" 
The law: 
As far back as 1978, the Appeal Court ruled in the matter, viz Ex Parte Minister of 
Justice 1978 (2) SA 572 (A) in support of Section 4 of the Usury Act which determines 
that if a borrower or credit receiver or lessee fails to pay any amount due upon the date 
when such amount is payable, the moneylender shall thereupon be entitled to recover 
26 
an additional amount of finance charges for the period of default at the interest rate that 
applied at the time of default. 
Furthermore, it was an internal policy of Saambou Bank to increase interest unilaterally 
to maximise profitability, which is a contravention of Section 5(1 )(c) of the Act that 
determines that the agreed rate must apply. 
Hence, public knowledge on the overstatement of financial results was badly perceived 
by the investors in the secondary market, and from that point, the market reacted and 
pushed the share price down, sending a bad signal to depositers, who reacted by 
withdrawing funds at amuch faster pace than collections from mortgage bond payers, 
thereby resulting in liquidity and cash flow problems. 
The debiting of administration costs without complying to the limit set by the Usury Act, 
while the only administration cost that is permitted by the Usury Act is the R 5,00 
monthly fee, implied poor corporate governance. 
Curatorship: 
On 9 February 2002, Saambou Bank was placed under curatorship after an alleged 
"run" on the bank prior to the collapse, in the course of which investors, mainly Investec, 
withdrew R 1 billion from Saambou. But nobody saw any long queues at Saambou 
branches - so the "run" was large corporate investors, who had access to inside 
information. 
Who pulled the plug on Saambou, resulting in its post acquisition Failure? 
Everyone trust's their bankers and the powers that (supposively) regulate them. Perhaps 
the most glaring remains the one about the alleged "run" on the bank prior to the 
collapse, in the course of which investors supposedly withdrew R 1 bn from Saambou. 
But nobody saw long queues at Saambou branches - so the "run" was large corporate 
investors, who had access to inside information and the fingers are pointing to Investec. 
Just what was Investec's involvement in the Saambou debacle and the subsequent 
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dismemberment of the Bank? Much of the information is contained, apparently, in the 
still-secret KPMG report that the Reserve Bank resolutely refuses to release because 
the information may endanger SA's financial welfare and economy, implying that the 
stock market index movements are not entirely based on efficient market hypothesis, as 
there are indications on insider trading influencing movement of shares and to some 
extent impairing company images and their going concern sustainability. The reason 
given by the Reserve Bank for its refusal to release the report immediately has raised 
concerns that the regulatory shortcomings highlighted in the report could extend beyond 
Saambou (as per above on efficient market hypothesis of running the stock market). The 
question that needs to be asked is what" regulatory shortcomings" could endanger the 
S.A. economy and banking industry. 
Bank failures 
In approximately April 2001, Investec acquired Fedsure's 41 % stake in Saambou 
Holdings (Saambou Bank was Holding's wholly owned subsidiary). It made clear at an 
early stage that an investment into Saambou didn't really fit its portfolio strategy. 
Investec entered into a tender process for the stake and indicated that it was looking for 
something of the order of R 2 bn but when no offers of sufficient value were forthcoming, 
Investec abandoned the process. 
Investec was concerned about the overcharges on the Saambou mortgage and personal 
loans, and during July 2001 arrange a meeting with the financial consultant Emerald van 
Zyl who exploited the wrongdoings of Saambou Bank. (An issue which was ignored by 
the First Rand Group in its due diligence post acquisition strategy for Saambou bank, 
and hence resulted in post acquisition synergies not been realized, and the investment 
being worthless). 
During this meeting in Cape Town, Investec made no bones that they were concerned 
about the Usury Act violations by Saambou Bank. They were informed that the amount 
could be as high as R 4 bn on the mortgage loans. This amount could even be higher on 
the personal loan book of Saambou Bank. The matter which overstated the Saambou 
business valuation at acquisition point, and resulting in over-payment by First Rand for 
an investment which did not render long term benefits as a result of mal-administrative 
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functions (noted by Investec in July 2001 in the abandoned investment process as cited 
above) which were not rectified by the post acquisition strategy. 
In August that year, Investec appointed four of it's senior people ( David Lawrence, Glyn 
Burger, David Nurek, and Bradley Tapnack) to Saambou Holdings' board. Six months 
later, on 9 February 2001, Saambou Bank was put under curatorship. 
Shortly before the collapse of Saambou, an article was published in the Sunday Argus 
on 28 January 2002 under the title "Angry bank client claim home loan rip off". The 
article quoted Saambou Bank Chief Executive Johan Myburgh saying that "the bank's 
method of calculating interest is not, and never has been, contrary to the Usury Act". 
Sunday Argus referred to a letter in their possession from the Registrar of the Usury Act, 
Ms Lana van Zyl that she agreed that when interest was calculated in advance, credit 
interest had to be given to the client if any payment was made later that month. 
On Monday morning, Saambou tried to get a copy of the Registrar's letter from Van Zyl. 
They were informed that the letters of Ms Tanya Smuts and Lana van Zyl will be 
attached in an affidavit for a court application to stop the sale in execution of one of his 
clients properties. The documentation was served on Saambou's attorneys, De Klerk & 
Van Gend on Monday, 4 February 2002. 
Heavy sales of Saambou shares started the next day. The result was the alleged run on 
Saambou Bank. After all, if institutions had lost confidence, what else should depositors 
think? So who was leading the selling? The evidence points to Investec. From the 
perspective of the bank's depositors, who reacted by withdrawing their deposits as a 
result of indirect signals that were prevailing in the JSE secondary market, resulted in 
the direct cash outflow impact on the bank rendering it illiquid and with no going concern 
prospects. 
Once the curator (John Louw of KPMG, the accounting firm that is also Investec's 
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auditor) took office, he established a deal forum, intended to superintend the sale of 
Saambou's assets. Extraordinarily, senior Investec executives were members of the 
forum. The conflicts of interest that arise are so encompassing as to be mind-blowing. 
Later, Louw told the Reserve Bank that the Saambou group's structure was very 
complex and that some of its businesses may not have operated within their legal 
entities. Specific assets, identified by Investec, may have been transferred to entities 
that were subsidiaries of Saambou Holdings, not of Saambou Bank. 
As an example, nearly three weeks after the installation of a curatorship, a compulsorily 
convertible loan of R816m was converted into shares in Saambou Bank and Investec 
and Primevest sanctioned this. This enabled the continued settlement of interest due 
from Saambou Bank on promissory notes it had issued. It is suggested that what then 
happened is that these notes were tendered to the Reserve Bank, which bought them at 
face value. The sum was about R400m. 
And that's where, or so it seems, Investec's involvement ended. It is almost as though 
someone drew a line under the matter and firmly concluded that was that. 
One of the great mysteries at the time of Saambou's curatorship was the deal 
constructed by Investec ostensibly to "save" Saambou and presented to the Reserve 
Bank. Its structure was well formulated, and more convincing than what was finally 
adopted when FNB stepped in. 
Rejection of proposed Investec plan to rescue Saambou bank 
What is known is that it was accepted and supported by the Reserve Bank, but was 
vigorously opposed by the National Treasury. After it was given the Reserve Bank's 
imprimatur, deputy governor Gill Marcus called finance director-general Maria Ramos. 
What happened during that conversation isn't known but one result was that Finance 
Minister Trevor Manuel and governor Tito Mboweni had what is described as a "huge 
fight' about it. 
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Let's add a rider: the Financial Services Board has passed a Saambou internal audit 
report on insider trading to the Scorpions. One cannot think why. That report exonerates 
MD Johan Myburgh and executive director Charles Edwards from any misdeeds. All one 
can conclude is that this is another smoke and mirrors device intended to divert attention 
from those massive institutional sales. As observed at the time, Myburgh was being 
universally excoriated and on the basis of the information available at the time, anyone 
prosecuting this case in a court has two chances: nil and zero. 
The conclusion to all this is inescapable: Investec had a major say in the construct of the 
bank's curatorship and the process of dismembering it. To what extent it received 
preferential treatment is, presumably, hidden in the pages of that secret KPMG report. 
Mr. T.J. Louw was appointed as curator in terms of section 69 of the Banks Act and all 
efforts by the curator to sell Saambou as a going concern failed, (No party was prepared 
to buy the bank at an overstated value embraced in its Balance Sheet, as overpaying for 
the deal could result in less favourable returns, which signal another point of failed 
acquisition). In September 2002, FirstRand Bank Holdings obtained the mortgage book 
of Saambou Bank Limited through a Scheme of Arrangements proposed by First Rand 
between Saambou Bank Limited, then under curatorship, and it's creditors (other than 
Saambou's creditors and funding creditors). The meeting for scheme creditors was held 
in Johannesburg at 9h00 on 5 August 2002 - but no bondholders attended the meeting. 
Scheme of arrangements to refund bondholders for overcharging on bond interest 
On 20 August 2002 the Scheme of Arrangement was sanctioned by the High Court 
(Transvaal Provincial Division). The order was registered with the Registrar of 
Companies on 30 August 2002, and all of a sudden bondholders became scheme 
creditors and had to submit their claims to the curator within 60 days i.e. by not later than 
30 October 2002. 
Who's footing the bill: 
After the collapse of Saambou Bank, the Government and the Reserve Bank agreed to 
provide liquidity support - so the taxpayers are to stand in for all the illegal fees that 
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FirstRand are currently recovering from prejudiced clients, which at this time could be 
approximately R 5 billion. 
Below, is a statement from the web gate Saambou website, indicating the sub-standard 
approach between stakeholders at the point of structuring of the acquisition deal 
between First Rand and Saambou bank. 
The unresolved differences and unknown factors between the stakeholders at 
acquisition point, unfolded more diversity of interests and unresolved inefficiencies not 
covered in the post-acquisition strategy of the business after acquisition, and these 
pulled the plug for business failure. 
In the foregoing, all efforts by the curator to sell Saambou bank as a going concern 
failed. In September 2002, First Rand Bank Holdings Limited obtained Saambou Bank 
Limited through a scheme of arrangements proposed by First Rand between Saambou 
Bank Limited, then under curatorship, and its creditors other than Saambou's depositors 
and funding creditors. The meeting for scheme creditors was held in Johannesburg at 
09h00 on the 5th August 2002, but no bondholders attended the meeting. 
Below, are the reasons that led to the curator's failure to sell the business as a going 
concern: 
None of the more than 60 000 Saambou bondholders were officially informed of the 
meeting. Emerald van Zyl, financial consultant from Cape Town, who represented more 
than 200 Saambou bondholders, only learnt of the meeting five days before the time -
but the documentation he needed to represent his clients was deliberately delayed, and 
only handed over to Gologix Couriers by the curator for delivery on Friday afternoon, 2 
August 2002 at 13h00. The documentation was only delivered to him per courier in Cape 
Town at 11 hOO on Monday - two hours after the meeting had started in Johannesburg. 
Arrangement approved:- The Scheme of Arrangement was sanctioned by the High 
Court (Transvaal Provincial Division) in terms of the order granted on 20 August 2002. 
The order was registered with the Registrar of Companies on 30 August 2002. All claims 
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by scheme creditors, as defined in the arrangement, had to be submitted to the curator 
within 60 days i.e. by not later than 30 October 2002. 
accusations:-
Louw and the Reserve Bank were widely accused in the media, for assisting fraud 
cover-up in an effort to avoid claims due to bondholders, possibly worth millions of 
rands. 
Herman le Roux, an ex-deputy director in the Department of Trade and Industry, who 
was responsible for administrating the Usury Act, describes the scheme of arrangement 
in the magazine, Noseweek as: "the biggest cover-up in the history of SA banking" 
questions that Louw refuses to answer-
Could a bondholder with a debit balance on 9 Feb 2002 with an overpayment on his 
bond be classified as a scheme creditor? 
How many bondholders attended the meeting of scheme creditors on 5 August 2002 
• In which of two categories defined as scheme creditors did they vote? 
• If bondholders as a class were not represented, nor voted at the scheme 
meeting, would they be bound by the scheme of arrangements? 
• Why is the receiver, after more than three years, still adjudicating mortgage 
claims, on matters that the Appeal Court adjudicated viz Ex Parte Minister of 
Justice 1978(2) SA 572(A) as far back as 1978? 
Financial consultant, Emerald van Zyl, who acts on behalf of approximately 200 
Saambou bondholders and assisted 140 homeowners in stopping the sale in execution 
of their properties after legal action by Saambou, could not obtain any answers to the 
abovementioned questions from the receiver John Louw. 
Below is the letter dated 24 September 2003 to the receiver, Mr. John Louw. 
The letter from the financial consultant of the stated 200 bondholders, conveyed the 
following inherent weaknesses in the structured acquisition deal and on curatorship 
process of the bank. 
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The acquisition by First rand bank of the inaccurate mortgage book of Saambou, due to 
unaccounted advanced interest payments on debtors, and the over-statement of the 
debtors book due to non-reflected Balance Sheet liabilities from advanced payment by 
bondholders. 
The continued operational inefficiency assumed by First Rand Group post acquisition. 
Mortgage book not taken over by First rand at a fair value at acquisition, due to inherent 
misstated value from Saambou's Balance Sheet. Most unfortunately above all, not 
queried and qualified in Saambou's audit reports, and thereby misleading users of 
Saambou's financial statements at due diligence and business acquisition point. 
The curatorship and liquidation process not complying with the Companies Act 
requirements which stipulate that, for dissolution of any legal entity, a special resolution 
should be obtainable from all its creditors (which was not the case with Saambou). 
Below, are cited questions which were raised against the Saambou bank's curator for 
non-compliance with the Companies Act requirements and PFMA requirements 
essential for compliance within dissolution of entities of similar nature, which were not 
complied with in the case of Saambou bank's curatorship. As per website publication on 
January 2004 on http:// www.bankqate.co.za/ How FNB continues to rip off Saambou 
bank bondholders.htm. 
Mortgage-Bonds: 
• How many bondholders attended the Scheme of Arrangement meeting held 
on 5 August 2002? 
• If any, in which of the two categories of scheme creditors as defined in the 
Scheme of Arrangements, did they vote? 
• Were all bondholders informed in writing of the meeting of scheme creditors 
on 5 August 2002? If not, why not? 
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• In your letter dated 13 March 2003 to Mr. Curt von Keyserlingk, Editor, Sake 
Rapport, you are on record as having written the following : 
"Only creditors who were creditors at the time of the holding of the scheme meeting [on 
5 August 2002] were notified. Late claims are catered for in the scheme of 
arrangements". 
When you were appointed as curator by the minister of finance, Mr. Trevor Manuel, on 9 
February 2002, you became aware of more than twenty bondholders who at that time 
had submitted claims in respect of overpayments. If they were by definition "scheme 
creditors" why did the names of these bondholders not appear on the list of known 
scheme creditors that was submitted to Court and why were they not informed of the 
scheme meeting on 5 August 2002? 
• You are on record as having said that the Usury Act is "badly worded and open 
for interpretation". In my letter dated 1 August 2003, I drew your attention to the 
contraventions of the directives as contained in the Usury Act related to 
Saambou Bank's mortgage bonds. These contraventions had been supported 
by the Appeal Court, viz, Ex Parte Minister of Justice 1978 (2) SA572(A). 
Further, I refer you to an extract from paragraph 3.2 on page 62 of the book titled 
"Basic Principles of Consumer Credit Law" by Prof. N.J. Grove [BA LLB LLM (UP) 
LLD (RAU)], Professor in the Department of Private Law, University of Pretoria and 
L. Jacobs [BCOM (Ace) (UTC) BLC LLB (UP] Senior Lecturer in the Department of 
Mercantile and Labour Law, University of Pretoria, in which the following relevant 
questions are answered:-
Until which date should finance charges be calculated? 
In Ex Parte Minister of Justice, the court decided that the period for the calculation of 
finance charges terminates on the date stipulated for payment. 
On which amount should finance charges be calculated? 
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The court held in Ex Parte Minister of Justice that finance charges are to be calculated 
on the balance of the principle debt owing from time to time". 
In a letter dated 29 August 2003 you advised all clients who had submitted claims for 
refunds of overpayments on their mortgage, that you were, after almost one year, still in 
the process of adjudicating these claims. In the light of the Appeal Court's 
aforementioned judgment in 1978, and the fact that you are after one year still 
adjudicating mortgage claims, would you also be prepared to say that the judgment 
could be regarded as "badly worded and open for interpretation". 
Personal loans 
In a letter dated 15 March 2002 the Registrar of the Usury Act, Ms. Lana van Zyl 
informed you that administration fees of R 1 140,00 were illegally debited and "should be 
written back as the act does not make provision for administration costs to be levied on 
any money lending transaction other than housing". 
"We are aware that overcharges took place. Saambou bank should have changed their 
method, but they did not. We would assist clients with their claims against the curator 
and would, if necessary, open a special auxiliary line". 
Furthermore, if there were no overpayments by clients on the personal loan book, could 
you please explain why you sold the loan book for one third of the price ? 
In response, the Registrar of the Usury Act, conveyed that, In the aforementioned letter, 
I addressed the personal loans of three clients namely J.Greeff, H. Briesies and E.J. 
Carstens, and you would have noticed that on all three of these accounts the maximum 
interest rates permitted by the Usury Act, were exceeded. 
In a letter dated 22 September 2001 the Registrar of the Usury Act, Ms. Lana van Zyl, 
informed Mr. Myburgh, that Saambou Bank contravened section 2(1 )(a) of the Usury Act 
on the account of Mr. Greeff, by charging a higher interest rate on his non exempted 
loan as permitted by the Usury Act. I attach this letter as annexure "D". 
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Further to Van Zyl's letter to the curator of Saambou bank, the following question was 
raised to the curator: 
If you were aware that Saambou Bank exceeded the maximum rates as permitted by the 
Usury Act on personal loans, could you please explain why you informed the media that 
Saambou Bank did not overcharge their clients? 
I await your response and would appreciate acknowledge of receipt of this letter. 
The letter of the receiver dated 3 October 2003 in reply to Van Zyl's letter. 
Before forming your opinion here is some more information: 
A legal opinion by Adv M Welz concluded: "It is my opinion that the clients (bondholders) 
are not included in the scheme of arrangement between the offeror and the two voting 
classes of scheme creditors, and are therefore not bound by the terms of the 
arrangement". 
The fearless and indefatigable magazine, Noseweek, reported in the Oct - Nov 2002 
edition, as follows: 
Tthere was no-one present at that meeting of creditors to represent the interest of the 
mortgage bondholders. Van Zyl says that he first learnt of the meeting five days before it 
took place - but the documents he needed to represent his clients were only delivered 
to him per courier in Cape Town two hours after the meeting had begun in 
Johannesburg. 
Stated below, are some operational inefficiencies which First Rand failed to combat in its 
post acquisition strategy, mainly because of their main interest for the acquisition was to 
diversify its interest in the low income subsidy housing market, than address the 
functional inefficiencies to streamline future operations. 
These inefficiencies were outlined in the letter by the Receiver of Revenue to the curator 
of Saambou bank, Mr Johan Louw 
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Contents of the Letter 
I refer to a letter written on your behalf by Ms. Renet van Wyk dated 13 August 2003 in 
response to my letter dated 1 August 2003. 
I refer to paragraph three of the aforementioned letter where you deny allegations that 
yourself, First National Bank and the Reserve Bank are covering up the overcharges on 
mortgage and personal loans to prevent the refunding of hundreds of millions of rands 
by National Treasury to prejudiced clients. 
With reference particularly to your accusation in respect of libellous (lasterlike) 
statements, I wish to inform you that the following correspondence has been published 
on the website www.bankqate.co.za: 
Is the receiver of Saambou Bank, Mr. John Louw, covering up the overcharges on 
mortgage and personal loan accounts? - form your own opinion". 
Saambou synergies driving the acquisition process by First Rand Group 
4.7 Motivation 
One of the motivating factors for the First Rand acquisition of Saambou were the positive 
financial results reported prior to the deal been announced. Based on the favourable 
returns, and market opportunities in the subsidized government low income housing loan 
schemes, First Rand projected synergies out of that deal by overlooking inherent credit 
and operational risks pre and post acquisition. 
Below, is the financial performance used for due diligence purposes and for determining 
the value at acquisition, which ultimately did not focus on the sustainability of the 
underlying performance when basing value at acquisition. 
As referenced in, Jan. 2004. http:// www.bankgate.co.za/ financial services.htm. 
Saambou bank fits its niche more comfortably. The restructuring of the niche financial 
service provider Saambou has paid off handsomely for the group with headline earnings 
rocketing by over 40% in the year to March 01. 
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And at Friday's board meeting to approve the results, the company will ask shareholders' 
approval later this month to privately place 9.3 million non-issued shares at R15.60 to 
raise R145 million to, "establish new alliances". 
An emphasis on cost reduction and an increase in non-interest income enabled 
Saambou bank to increase total income by 16.3% to R378.3 million from R325.4 million 
in the previous year, while expenditure rose by only 5.6% to R245.9 million (R232.8 
million). This left net operating income 43% higher at R132.4 million (R92.6 million). 
The overall restructuring and cost-cutting efforts, which were accounted for financially in 
the past year, will be completed at the end of this calendar year but were already evident 
in the second half. The 5.6% increase in operating costs compares with the 17% 
increase at the halfway stage. 
An added bonus has been an exceptional item of R58.2 million added to the income 
statement, largely from the sale of the company's interest in Rentsure Holdings for R49.8 
million. 
Added to the income statement, this pushed attributable profits up by 112.3% to R101.9 
million, from R48 million and included a substantial increase in the taxation charge to 
R51.1 -million from R18.8 million. Bank Chief Executive, Johan Myburgh points out, 
however, that R30.5 million of this represents a once-off Vat charge on an insurance 
premium. Total earnings, therefore, increased to 80.5c a share against 37.9c a share. 
The group says the bank is now managing its credit risks on an insurance basis in 
conjunction with an international reinsurer, which will allow improved ability to absorb 
bad debts. 
A final dividend of 7.5c a share has been declared, taking the total for the year to 11c 
(7.9c). A capitalisation issue in lieu of the dividend will be offered. It is expected that 
Fedsure, with a stake of 47% in Saambou, and Metropolitan will opt for the capitalisation 
issue. 
A much stronger balance sheet shows total net assets increasing to R10 billion from 
R7.7 billion, while the net asset value has risen to 306.2c a share against 222.9c a 
share. 
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4.8 Economic and Political factors in today's mergers and acquisition deals 
The main drivers for mergers were management buy-outs as a result of large companies 
divesting their non-core business, failing firms, black economic empowerment initiatives, 
in particular in the mining and petroleum industries, and financial services restructuring. 
Of the total number of cases finalised, twenty three were viewed favourably on public 
interest grounds,( See Above case on : First Rand v Saambou acquisition that was 
referred to arbitration by the Competition Board - First Rand Saambou deal was 
declared not to be in the public interest, due to the deal not bringing any diversity to 
financial institutions service offerings, with no positive impact on tariffs as other big 
banks we found to be in a position to intervene on prices if the deal could result in price 
changes, as well as projected post-acquisition market share not expected to change 
between the two banks) that is, they positively affected black economic empowerment 
and small and medium enterprises. The greatest impact was in mining, followed by 
manufacturing and retail, whereas other sectors contributed less than 10% each in this 
regard. The 27% black economic empowerment component of merger activity 
attributable to mining, compares favourably when viewed against overall merger activity, 
where mining comprised 9% of all mergers notified with the Commission. Wholesale 
activities contributed 9% in terms of black economic empowerment and small and 
medium enterprise development, and only 5% of total merger activity. The figures for 
other sectors, however, leave much room for improvement in terms of black economic 
empowerment and small and medium enterprise participation. 
Mergers using Special Purpose Vehicle entities have increased from 17 in 2001/02 to 21 
in 2002/03. This is possibly linked to the desire by large companies to unbundle and 
create new firms with which to enter new markets or for sale when representing non-
core assets. 
There has been little merger activity involving BEE and SME. This can be attributed, 
inter alia, to the difficulties these entities face in raising finance for buying other interests. 
Twenty two BEE cases were notified during 2002/03 and 11 cases during 2001/2. 
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4.9 Motivating factors behind Financial Services deals 
There has been an increase in merger activity in the financial services sector - from 12% 
to 13.8%. This increase is indicative of the restructuring of the financial services sector 
following the demise of Saambou and BOE during the financial year. 
Like any other merger, a banking transaction is notified to the Commission if it meets the 
merger thresholds (First Rand v Saambou activity did not satisfy the threshold as it was 
perceived not to be in the public interest, with no economies of scale and no benefits of 
post merger restructuring of service operations arising out of the merger/acquisition, and 
hence the outcome of the demise in Saambou). Once the Commission receives a 
banking transaction, a notice is sent to the Minister of Finance. As a result of an 
amendment to the Competition Act, the Minister of Finance now has the authority to 
revoke the jurisdiction of the Competition Authorities where systemic risk is a primary 
consideration (public interest). The Minister of Finance revoked the jurisdiction of the Act 
in six cases, see footnote 1. 
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Chapter 5: Evaluation of the Case 
5.1 Introduction 
The above case study is being analyzed to portray the objective of the study, and to 
emphasise and validate the problem embraced by the title of this research. 
The analysis below, is based on environmental and business behavioural factors around 
Porters five forces, SWOT and PEST analysis, leading to conclusions drawn thereof 
upon the facts of the case. 
5.2 Michael Porters Five Market Forces 
1 
Market Force 
Threat of new entrants 
Comment 
The threat of new entrants in the banking and financial 
institution sector is not of great significance, and most 
businesses in this sector do not consider it a crucial risk 
factor to have a strategy on it as part of their strategic 
planning. 
Even though, there are no restrictions in awarding of 
licences to the new entrants, whilst exit barriers are low, 
this appears to be one of the most attractive segment 
(Arbeeand Naidu, 2001). 
However, competition is still a factor to be taken note of, 
and focus on competitive strategies is imminent in the 
banking sector. Because, competition and growth is 
more focused on being a large player in the market, 
mergers and acquisitions for oligopolistic and market 
dominance reasons are a tool used in overcoming 
competition. Hence, the threat in this particular industry 




Threat of substitute 
products 
Threat of segment 
rivalry 
big role players who will undermine competitors as a 
result of large scale economies, and efficiency outcome 
of utilizing the acquired company's managerial skills for 
the benefit of the group. 
The above reasons were not of major substance in 
driving the deal for Saambou acquisition by First Rand 
Group, implying that the acquisition strategy did not 
cover all necessary areas of expected synergies. 
The main threat here for Saambou was that of similar 
product lines offered by competitors with more 
efficiency in service delivery, leading to more customer 
satisfaction at zero rate of queries. 
The key revenue streams for the bank was on interest 
earnings from customer deposits (withdrawal thereof 
led to business failure) and on mortgage loans (not fully 
recoverable due to a certain degree of defaulting 
customers). 
The main threat here for Saambou was on poor service 
delivery to customers, were competitors took advantage 
and ceased the market in terms of cash flows that were 
diverted from Saambou to competitors by shaky 
depositors uncertain about the bank's future. 
The banking segnment rivalry for First Rand acquisition 
of Saambou was rife, as there were other large role 
players in the market i.e. Standard Bank, ABSA and 
other acquired smaller banks by these large ones all 
coming up with the same service offerings at more cost 
efficiency and more customer satisfaction levels. 
The post acquisition results of Saambou did not portray 
any synergistic returns on investnment, whilst the 
customer satisfaction index (Customer satisfaction 
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4 Threat of buyers 
(bondholders) growing 
bargaining power 
ratings) did not show any improvement compared to 
pre-acquisition period, as is the case on the example 
above under Chapter 2 portraying synergies of Capital 
Alliance acquisition of Fedlife, where service level 
statistics reflect improvement in service delivery to 
clients as opposed to pre-acquisition ratings. This 
implies that segment rivalry was intense for Saambou 
and first Rand Group, as deemed by the Competition 
Commission during the Tribunal case between First 
Rand and Saambou, which decided that the acquisition 
will have no great impact on competition as it will lead 
to no market growth, and will not have the power to 
regulate pricing against competitors. (See Tribunal case 
above by the Competition Commission). 
According to Arbee and Naidu (2001), a segment is 
unattractive if the buyers posses a strong or growing 
bargaining power. 
Buyers have the potential of forcing the price 
adjustments if they have a bargaining power of 
choosing where to procure services in an open market 
situation. Hence, with banks, the market is more open 
and unrestricted, resulting in rates/price war on service 
offerings compared to those of competitors. Also, poor 
customer service, like was the case with Saambou 
bondholders who were overcharged interest on 
mortgage loans, with the public knowledge of this 
sending wrong sentiments in the market and leading to 
the bank's demise. 
Mortgage loans are also not fully secured assets in 
terms of value, which are balanced against secured 
customer borrowings, and this poses a financial risk in 
the bank's balance sheet from the buyers perspective, 
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which can lead to cash flow problems for any financial 
institution, including what happened with Saambou. 
According to Arbee and Naidu (2001), a segment is 
unattractive if the suppliers posses a strong or growing 
bargaining power. 
A supplier being a party the business falls into 
obligation for future payment with. Hence, in banking 
this is mainly classified as depositors of funds, who 
borrow funds to the institution. 
In the case of banks, the nature of that industry and its 
form of short to medium term capitalization render 
suppliers with more bargaining power, resulting in 
extreme competitive pressure, which results in 
incentives such as offering the public services at 
competitive rates, which in other industry can be 
classified as a pricing war. 
Hence, to proof this point beyond doubt, anything that 
results in poor service delivery or sends negative 
signals to the public can result in capital outflow from 
panicking depositors in a form of withdrawals and on 
speculative grounds, thereby leading to business 
failure, as it was the case with Saambou Bank. 
Hence, Saambou bank's demise was the result of 
strong bargaining power of suppliers/depositors in 
response of negative sentiments about the bank as 
perceived in the market. 




Having discussed the outcome of Porters Five forces competitive strategies and inherent 
features thereof associated with Saambou bank, it becomes evident from the stand point 
of Saambou that, the acquisition by First Rand Limited did not accord the bank a 
competitive edge and value add from the pre-acquisition strategies that were in 
existence before take over. The bank's relationship and interaction with the outside 
world was neither strengthened nor made more effective by post-acquisition strategies 
from the First Rand group. 
In addition, from the case above, the business approach for Saambou can be analyzed 
in terms of internal processes efficiencies/deficiencies and outcome of its relationship 
with the external environment. This can be expressed by analyzing the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats which were facing the business as perceived 
from the above case study and theory statement citing Saambou operations. Below is 
the SWOT analysis of the Saambou case. 
5.3 SWOT Analysis 
Strengths • The availability of differentiated service offerings 
to its customer base at competitive rates with 
flexibility of moving borrowed funds between 
money market investment accounts and the 
capital market, i.e Tradek Banking Products, re 
Saambou Share Manager website. The 
movement of funds was facilitated by the bank 
through secured loan funding to enable 
borrowers to speculate and maximize their 
returns from borrowed bank funds. 
• Diversification of service offerings, by 
incorporating trust property business within its 
business segments, and boosting pre-
acquisition returns to motivate the First Rand 
acquisition. 
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The original definition of'financial institution' prior to 
amendment in 1997, did not contain the qualification 
that the bank or mutual bank must deal with trust 
property as a regular feature of its business. I agree 
with counsel for the first (second and fourth) 
respondents that the legislature realised in 1997 
that the application of the legislation was potentially 
wider than intended and then gave effect to its true 
intention. 
Weaknesses • Poor Corporate Governance that led the 
business to its failure in cases where the bank 
contravened the Financial services Usury Act, 
i.e. by over-charging customers on interest, as a 
result of calculating finance charges on balances 
not yet due for settlement at a particular cut off 
point. 
• Weak internal control systems and processes 
inherent from the implementation of a computer 
software system (i.e. Twenty 20, Canadian 
Fincentric system) that is unique to the South 
African banking operations, with no relative 
benchmarks perculiar to South African banking 
operations, and with no outstanding Service 
Provider support in south Africa. 
• The imbalanced financial risk from the capital 
structure of the bank. Customer short-deposits 
which constitutes a liability obligation for the 
business were worth R 12.751 billion, far 
outweighing the mortgage book which amounted 
to R4.878 billion, hence leaving working capital 
(excl cash equivalents) in a deficit position, or in 
a negative short-term gearing position. 
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• The acquisition by First Rand did not render 
synergies, as it was unlikely to increase the 
market share of the two banks after acquisition, 
(see: Competition Board Tribunal case above) 
• Lack of adequate skills and experienced know-
how amongst the bank's management. See 
extract below from Saambou website about their 
problematic software technology (Twenty 20, 
which was rescued by Standard Chartered 
Bank) 
"Thank God we were so naive about what was needed 
to run a bank," begins Christo Davel, CEO of Saambou. 
Considering that he launched a bank in 18 months, 
found himself less than seven months later at the wrong 
end of a curatorship that wasn't his fault, kept the bank 
all dressed up with nowhere to go for another 18 
months, and has had to rebuild the bank almost from 
scratch in the past year, this admission by the bank's 
CEO is stunning. 
Opportunities Government subsidized low income housing 
scheme loan benefits that were directed to be 
offered through Saambou by government. (The 
main motivator for the acquisition, which 
impaired the due diligence for analysis of risks 
and facts surrounding the acquisition for 
streamlining of post-acquisition strategy). 
Threats The acquisition had no potential for business 
growth within Saambou, hence competition was 
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not mitigated and the price war remained intact 
as before the acquisition. 
To further gain thorough knowledge about the business, in this case how Saambou's 
relationship with the outside world sufficed, and how mismanagement of the external 
environmental factors led to poor governance, which resulted in corporate failure. Also, 
in business, the discussion on strategy for business continuity centers around proper 
planning and decision making around four areas, i.e. Political, Economic, Social and 
Political (PEST) factors. 
Any poor planning and bad corporate governance on PEST, jeopardizes the long term 
continuity of business, as per reading from Effective Strategic Leadership by John Adair. 
To further analyse the above case study for Saambou, a PEST analysis on the above 
case factors clarifies management and First Rand Group's/FNB lack of strategic focus 
and vision on PEST factors for long term continuity of the bank post acquisition. 
5.4 PEST Analysis 
Political • The political transformation in 
South Africa led to several merger 
and acquisition deals in an effort to 
facilitate corporate expansion, and 
for larger conglomerates attempt to 
achieve business opportunities 
accorded to small Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) sectors. The 
transformation led to the acquisition 
of smaller banks i.e. Saambou, 
BoE and Unibank by larger banking 
conglomerates in an effort to 
expand and for indirect participation 
on state accorded business 
opportunities to these smaller 
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Economic 
banks with BEE attributes. (This 
was a motivation for FNB 
acquisition of Saambou) 
• Bank Regulatory clauses that were 
transgressed by Saambou, 
including the wrong calculation of 
interest on mortgage bonds which 
resulted in the bank landing in debt 
against its customers, in 
transgression of the Banks Usury 
Act, which resulted in poor 
corporate image to clients and 
public. 
• Mergers and acquisitions are 
intended to facilitate industrial and 
economic growth by giving sound 
economic structures of business at 
micro level of the economy, which 
translates into improved efficiencies 
and capacity building at both 
corporate and national level. 
• Mergers and acquisitions render 
maximum utilization of economic 
resources within firms, and results 
in economies of scale benefits 
which make companies become 
more cost efficient, and more 
competitive in service delivery 
pricing. (Re: Theory statement on 
Capital Alliance - Review of 
Operations above) 




Saambou bank, due to its 
acquisition by First Rand group not 
fulfilling the above factors - (Re: 
judgement in the Saambou & First 
Rand Group case refered to 
arbitration by the Competition 
Commission - the judgement 
stated that, the acquisition does not 
indicate future growth in market 
share between the two banks, and 
will not have any impact on 
rendering low prices/rates as there 
were no foreseen economies of 
scale, and bigger banks could 
afford to intervene in pricing. 
• Saambou was used as a vehicle by 
Government to deliver its social 
aspirations of providing low income 
housing subsidies to facilitate 
housing loans for government 
employees. Being the key motivator 
to the acquisition by First Rand 
Limited. 
• Banking sector by nature does not 
posses much in terms of 
technological network and assets, 
except for computer network 
facilities for rendering services with 
clients and outside world through 
LAN and WAN network facilities. 
Hence, technology is in a form of 
Information Technology (IT) 
infrastructure, and also in the form 
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of software tools that renders 
service delivery to clients i.e. 
Fincentric/Twenty 20 Canadian 
software installed by Saambou. 
With Saambou, the above resulted 
in software Technology failure 
following the implementation of 
Twenty 20 software, which upon its 
poor implementation, operational 
inefficiencies were experienced by 
the bank resulting in customer 
service deficiencies, bad publicity 
and eventual depositors run out on 
the bank, causing shortfall on 
liquidity and downfall of the bank. 
Lack of adequate post 
implementation follow up budget, 
and unavailability of system back 
up support in RSA due to the 
system being a unique Canadian 
banking software not popular in 
RSA, implies that, bad business 
decisions affecting future outcome 
of operations were made when 
selecting operating software, by 
overlooking inherent risks from a 
software operating perspective, that 
resulted in operating inefficiencies. 
5.5 Further Analysis of the Case 
While the internal process of evaluating the target company leads to the decision to 
acquire or merge with the company, an extra evaluation to the normal criteria of 
assessing the strategic fit, revenue forecasts, and product architecture, there are a 
number of subjective integration related criteria such as cultural fit, management style, 
human resources issues and employee morale that must be included at this stage of the 
evaluation. 
Many companies make the mistake of assigning these other factors a lower priority 
when making the ultimate decision to pursue the target company. Countless examples of 
failed mergers and acquisitions prove that when critical personnel and organizational 
issues driving the merger/acquisition process are overlooked in the due diligence 
process, the overwhelming odds are that even the most promising transactions will fail. 
Chasing a merger or acquisition should be based on fundamental synergies that will add 
value in real sense, (reason proved not to be taken into consideration by the First Rand 
Saambou acquisition strategy, as evidenced by the Pre-acquisition case referred to the 
Tribunal by the Competition Commission - See case study above in Chapter 3). Most 
mergers & acquisitions are based on setting a strategy for growth with no underlying 
synergies. For example, perhaps because of chasing size for size's sake without no 
additional capacity in utilization of existing assets or in distribution channels (no 
economies of scale benefits), or as a result of following a diversification strategy which 
stayed too far from the buyer's core competencies. 
First and foremost, the acquisition should be in alignment with management's overall 
business strategy and should provide the best fit within the entire corporate plan. 
Lack of proper due diligence is another problem common to failed mergers and 
acquisitions. Due diligence should play a major role in reducing the risk being taken on 
by making an acquisition or merger. 
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These days part of the value of a company can be found on its intangible assets, and 
due diligence process will help in assessing the fair values attributable to these assets, 
as book values may no longer bear relevance, and whether the target company really 
has title to these assets. 
Evaluation of other quantifiable and non-quantifiable risk areas is covered in the due 
diligence process on matters such as risks on imminent bankruptcy I.e. consistency and 
alignment of software tools and processes was overlooked in the Saambou acquisition 
by First Rand), significant off-balance sheet liabilities, employee retention issues and 
regulatory issues (contravention of the Banks Usury Act which was prevalent before 
acquisition, was not addressed in the post acquisition strategy as this continued even 
after acquisition). The anticipated outcome of these events is filtered through the 
valuation process for negotiation and bargaining by both parties, to avoid future failure of 
the acquisition based on wrong valuation assumptions not rendering expected levels of 
future returns. 
A merger or acquisition should be undertaken as part of delivering corporate goals that 
are embodied in the strategic plan of an organization. To comply with the value 
enhancement embodied in the corporate strategies in delivering the plan, due diligence 
should be used to evaluate acquisition prospects that will suit the value expectations as 
laid out in the business plan, even before embarking on a transaction. This will allow 
management to expediently eliminate from consideration companies that do not fit the 
acquirer's goals. 
Part of the valuation problem emanates from the overly optimistic culture of individuals 
when attributing value to underlying synergies. This is often because the source for 
synergies has not been thought through correctly. Merging with a company in the same 
industry for growth in market share and for economies of scale is a valid reason, (reason 
unfulfilled in the title and case study example inherent in this project). But attention may 
not be paid to the accounts that may be lost as a result of the merger, and or the 
Regulator's and Competition Board's intervention to keep competition alive by protecting 
other licenced entrepreneurs by regulating tariffs to a level where competitive pricing 
cannot be exercised to lure customers from competitors (First Rand acquisition of 
Saambou was declared not conducive to effecting competitive pricing, as the foreseen 
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result was no growth in market share between the two banks, with no inherent 
economies of scale benefits) , but only resulting in increased margins without real 
economies of scale emanating from the merger. 
In light of the above, it can be seen that the objective for market share growth can be 
impeded by tariffs and regulatory issues, (for which the Saambou acquisition as 
indicated in this project, did not have such impact that could lead to the Banks Regulator 
intervention, or price war between banks in the same industry), and if these strategic 
reasons and outcomes cannot be analyzed in a way that produces numbers that make 
valuation sense and in identify any value add to the transaction if any, then probably the 
deal will be based on wrong reasons, and the company should consider not to embark 
on the deal at all, or otherwise the same company can later be announced selling the 
stake it recently acquired or undergoing the process of restructuring and rationalization 
shortly after the deal. 
Saambou Service levels 
As per on-line publication dated Oct, 2003. http://www.bankgate.co.za/Saambou service 
levels.htm, the bank inherited bad publicity through its service levels to customers. 
Service delivery was below acceptable standards, with bad news pertaining to poor 
service delivery being made public and damaging the bank's image, and resulting in its 
loss of value to investors in the capital markets. 
Also, non compliance with the banking industry's governing rules and regulations (i.e. 
contravention with the banks Usury Act) led to loss of confidence by the market and the 
investors, and ultimately leading to erosion of capital, liquidity and market and customer 
confidence for the bank. 
Hence, the above factors occurred even post acquisition period of Saambou by First 
Rand Group, to highlight the fact that, the acquisition was mainly market driven to 
facilitate First Rands indirect participation in the Government granted low income 
housing schemes market segment, of which Saambou was granted the opportunity of 
financing and delivering. 
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The post acquisition strategy for First Rand group did not cover overall elements of 
governing the acquired bank, and no overall review of policies and business processes 
was undertaken, and improved to ensure better service delivery, efficiency and 
effectiveness of operations amid the bank's failure post acquisition by the First Rand 
Group. Hence, the following statement from the Saambou website justifies the above 
reasons on Saambou's bad service levels. 
The Road to Destruction 
In the early 1990's, Mr. Johan Myburgh, a member of the Afrikaner Broederbond was 
appointed Chief Executive of Saambou Bank. For years, he was one of South Africa's 
most respected Bankers. In 2000, he was honoured as Pretoria's man of the year. Year 
after year, everyone listened to Myburgh's entertaining presentation at "Profit 
Announcements" and enjoyed the refreshments provided. 
However, he achieved his goals to the detriment of his clients and staff. 
In 1995, Saambou Bank paid admission of guilt for charging illegal administration fees 
on clients' personal loan accounts. In the media, Saambou admitted that all of their 90 
000 client accounts were recalculated and corrected. It was later revealed that a mere 
264 clients were refunded. 
The Commercial branch of the Police is currently investigating seven different 
contraventions of the Usury Act against Saambou on personal and home loan accounts. 
During the past 2 years, Emerald van Zyl had assisted 135 Saambou bondholders in 
stopping the sale in execution of their properties following action taken by Saambou 
against so-called "defaulting bank clients". 
However, after recalculation of the accounts, it was discovered that the clients had been 
incorrectly debited, and were not in arrears at all. 
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In one matter, Saambou summonsed a client for R 46 000 which it alleged was 
outstanding on his bond, but recalculations proved otherwise - the client had overpaid 
Saambou by R 54 000. 
Saambou's share prices plummeted as bad news and rumours grew, Saambou faced 
losses on its home and personal loan book because of Usury Act violations. 
Directors began selling shares - massive interest free loans to the value of more than R 
200 million (now worthless) were made to staff to entice them to buy Saambou shares, 
and one wonders how many more examples of blatant corporate deception will come to 
light before the Officers of this company are punished. 
They have robbed Peter to pay Paul on investments, and we will be going into more 
detail about this very soon. 
This is how Saambou Bank contravened the directives of the the Usury Act-
Mortgage Loans: -
• Interest in advance - no credit interest for payments. 
• Increasing interest rate when the account is in arrears 
• Illegal administration costs and other diversifications 
• Increasing homeowners insurance when account is in arrears. 
Personal Loans: -
• Interest - Exceeding the Usury Act ceiling on non-exempted loans. 
• Unlawful administration fees 
• Unlawful interest charges on single premium life insurance for longer than 12 
months. 
• Credit life Insurance covering a period of more than one year 
• Failure to provide proof that the amount charged was paid over on behalf of the 
client to the life assurer. 
• Interest above Usury Act limits on loans where the sum advance, plus the 
insurance premium exceeds R 10 000. 
57 
Hence, the absence of a standardized operating and financial system within the First 
Rand Group due to Saambou being acquired only for the sole purpose of taking over the 
Government subsidized low income housing schemes, led to a lack of focus and 
strategy of maintaining uniformity of approach to operations and processes within the 
group. This can be evidenced by the above stated contraventions to the directives of the 
Usury Act. 
Processes for maintaining efficiency and effectiveness of operations were not given 
attention at the stage of signing the deal, the due diligence exercise was not 
comprehensive to cover these issues. Hence, lack of standardized processes of 
operation due to different control systems being applicable within the banking group 
resulted in non-uniformity of operations within the business units, and those that were 
non-core to the scope of the First Rand business ended up in failure. 
The above can be evidenced by Saambou's conversion from a banking on line system 
called 20Twenty to Fincentric. The latter was not applicable to core banking operations 
of the First Rand group, and also new system with less back up support service in South 
Africa, thereby adding to the post acquisition operational risk of the merger and 
acquisition deal. 
According to Correia et al., (1993), another reason for mergers and acquisitions is the 
resultant economies of scale for cost optimization, particularly for horizontal mergers and 
acquisitions. 
In the case of Saambou bank, the acquisition led to the bank's lendings (especially in the 
low income housing segment) exceeding borrowings by the bank, and the timing of 
borrowings not balanced with that of recoveries of monies from lendings, and hence 
resulting in liquidity problems from the imbalanced timing of cash flows and imbalanced 
inherent risks from the recoveries and settlement of cash flows. 
The reason for the bank's failure was on liquidity, which was not given attention 
as part of due diligence strategy for Saambou's post acquisition business plan. 
The above factor can be explained further below, 
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5.5.1 Lack of product diversification 
Saambou was operating in a risk oriented environment, stirred by the nature of 
Saambou's business of borrowing money and lending it out again, the funds became 
part of and commingled with Saambou's assets, whose recovery was not secured, whilst 
the deposit with bank were secured. From the inherent level of business risk in this 
regard, the short term nature of the business comprised of foreseeable liquidity risk, 
which required to have been balanced off by diversifying risk through the restructuring of 
service offerings to embrace medium to long term investments to secure funds for a 
further period, to avoid instant deposit withdrawals in few days that led to the cash flow 
problem that dissolved the bank. 
Post acquisition lack of risk diversification, through a broadened product mix that can 
sustain cash flows over a longer timeframe resulted in failure of the business, since the 
bulk of liabilities/obligations were of short-term nature, and that constituting core part of 
the business financing. 
See an extract below from the website on practice Management - Bank Failures 
Practice Management - Bank failures 
Were s 78(2A) investments 'trust property' separate from Saambou's assets? 
On investing the moneys with Saambou, the incorporated practices entered into 
separate relationships as clients of Saambou (the debtor) by investing moneys as 
creditors on behalf of their clients. The letters of the applicants stating that moneys had 
to be available immediately for transfers of immovable properties merely meant that they 
could not be placed in a medium-term or long-term 
investment. They had to be invested 'on call'. 
Customer deposit (banks liabilities) are secured funds, which translate into unsecured 
bank's assets resulting in risk of failure. Deposits/liabilities are deemed similar to funds 
held on trust on behalf of third parties. 
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I am of the opinion that the position of the money deposited in an attorney's trust 
account and the relationship between the bank, the attorney and the attorney's clients is 
still the same as prior to 23 November 2001 (when the Fl Act commenced) and as stated 
in the following cases: 
If the judgment is correct, by implication it has the result that one can argue that most 
deposits by clients with 'financial institutions' will be 'trust property'. Commercially 
speaking, I cannot think of any 'financial institution' which will receive money into an 
interest-bearing account without any opportunity to 'make money' with such money to 
derive a profit there-from to enable it to pay the interest and make a profit for 
shareholders. 
From the list of cited cases by the Competition Commission of South Africa in deciding 
whether the First Rand Group acquisition of Saambou bank will have any competition 
implications conducive or not conducive to the national economic framework for approval 
or disapproval of a merger or acquisition, the case for First rand/Saambou acquisition 
was recommended to the Tribunal by the Competition Commission, and referring to the 
case study in chapter Three below were the motivational facts and assumptions by the 
Tribunal in passing judgement the case, and the outcome of the tribunal thereof in terms 
of the impact of the acquisition and lack of inherent synergies thereof. 
Hence, from the facts of the case, inherent liquidity risks can be established, for which 
the acquirer did not give much attention when laying out the post-acquisition strategy of 
running the business, and ultimately resulting in problems of liquidity, and 
mismanagement of systems and processes, which led to the post acquisition failure of 
the bank. 
5.5.2 Motivation for the Saambou acquisition 
Below, are real motivating factors which set the criteria for mergers and acquisitions. 
The main force behind the deal between Saambou and First Rand, which was to allow 
FNB's indirect participation in the growing mortgage bond loan business accorded to 
Saambou by the Government low income housing subsidy scheme, did not realize the 
expected synergies, as it was evident from the beginning that, this will not render growth 
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in market share between the two banks, and will not have competitive effect and benefit 
in pricing to the end customer - See pre-acquisition case refereed to the Tribunal by the 
Competition Board. 
All the highlighted criteria below which sets the trend for successful mergers and 
acquisitions were not embraced or achieved in the First Rand Saambou deal. 
Mergers and acquisitions are an important part of South African corporate life, and it is 
therefore relevant for us to analyze the reasons for business amalgamations both at a 
micro and macro level and how to set the terms for a successful deal. 
Mergers and acquisitions involve the supply and rotation of resources and if successfully 
carried out they stimulate economic activity. 
The idea starts at a micro or corporate level, whereby the whole reason for embarking 
on a merger/acquisition is to facilitate external business expansion for maximization of 
shareholders returns via synergies inherent in a merger or acquisition deal. While, at 
macro level the whole idea and intention is to attract foreign investment and privatization 
of state owned enterprises, as is the case now in South Africa. 
5.6 Reasons for mergers and acquisitions 
5.6.1 Micro purpose 
Business expansion is essential in the South African economy for the purpose of 
sustaining and increasing economic growth and employment levels. 
Properly conducted due diligence results in efficient and effective planning and 
integration process of business amalgamations, at precise values and expectations of 
post amalgamation results. Proper due diligence allows the setting of a successful 
integration strategy and strategy for going forward with the business post amalgamation 
business plan. Also, due diligence to a larger extent eliminates the risk of uncertainty in 
setting the plan for managing the business after the transaction has been concluded. 
With due diligence, the chances for risk exposure and business failure are exposed and 
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strategies set forthright on how to curb them, and at what price can the transaction take 
place amid known present circumstances and future results that are made probable. 
Hence at corporate level, synergistic benefits for maximizing corporate returns for 
investors and creation of employment in the economy are key objectives that must be 
supported with proper conduct and approach on how to make mergers & acquisitions 
become successful. 
5.6.2 Macro level 
In South Africa there is a drive to bring foreign investment through the privatization of 
state owned enterprises. In compliance with the World Bank and IMF's policy for 
Structural Adjustment Program, which advocates that developing countries must hand 
over their state owned assets to private hands for more efficient management of 
resources and inflow of foreign capital to repay their foreign and national debts and for 
investment in social activities. 
Through mergers and acquisitions, inflow of foreign capital is made possible through the 
merger of state enterprises with foreign investors who inject capital to become partners 
in a merger or joint venture agreements with local investors. An example would be the 
foreign investment to be generated out of the foreign bids for second fixed network 
operator in South Africa. 
With mergers and acquisitions, some companies gain international listing i.e. Telkom 
shares traded in London Stock Exchange, give companies exposure to foreign capital to 
facilitate the financing of projects for expansion. 
The favourable impact is that of improvement in the Balance of Payments through cash 
inflow in the capital account of the Balance of Payments and underpinning of the value 
of the Rand by the likely inflow of foreign currency reserves. 
Hence mergers and acquisitions play an integral role in streamlining the economy both 
at micro and macro level, therefore proper due diligence process for mergers & 
acquisitions to avoid their failure remains important at corporate and national level. 
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5.7 Value of Project 
Value of this project is determinable from the suggestions and recommendations that 
came out of the research exercise, and to what extent will its findings and 
recommendations add value or provide new insight knowledge to the practitioners in this 
field of mergers and acquisitions. 
The research was aimed at providing more information and optimal approach in the 
conduct of due diligence and business valuations issues that facilitate the acquisition 
transaction, and guidelines in formulation of best strategies for integration and post 
amalgamation running of the business, with risks known, analyzed and policies set to 
overcome such during due diligence. 
Acquisition strategy weaknesses and recommended guidelines on the above will 
contribute value to the field experts and potential candidates in this field, and research 
results will be of relevance to the Corporate Finance divisions of the Investment Banking 
Groups, for their advisory role to their clients and financing of clients for mergers and 
acquisition deal purposes. 
Checklist of items for reference to future transactions 
• How best to conduct due diligence 
• Checklist of due diligence procedures and guidelines to avoid possible risks and 
in formulating the most effective business strategy for integration and post 
amalgamation operations. 
• Best options and means of ensuring accuracy in merger/acquisition valuation 
deal. 
• Evaluation criteria leading to decision making on whether, and on how to invest 
in an acquisition deal. 
• How to base post transaction expectations and possible means of measurement 
against actual results. 
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Assurance on all of the above will imply that, there is a clear course of action on how to 
embark on a deal and that value can be quantified and risk minimized in the process of a 
merger or acquisition. 
5.8 Interview Results 
This section presents the results of the interviews, and is structured in accordance with 
the key research questions as set out in Appendix 1, following elite interviews that were 
conducted with David Thayser, partner for Corporate Finance at Ernst & Yong, and 
Harry Kelan, Executive Manager for Investment and Corporate Acquisitions for HSBC. 
Question 1 : 
Describe the key elements motivating M&A activity in industry? 
Response: 
The general view from the respondents is that the M&A activity is driven from a 
corporate objective of maximizing shareholders wealth by mitigating business risks from 
diversification of investments, to take market opportunities through direct and indirect 
participation in various of market opportunities, sustain market share dominance, and 
opportunity to acquire skills from different sectors of industry, as well as for integration of 
resources through business combinations. 
Question 2: 
What are the risks involved in corporate M&A deals? 
Sub questions 
a) What are the financial risks associated with poor planning for deciding on a deal 
for acquisition and mergers? 
b) From a post acquisition perspective, what are the critical common operating risk 
factors leading to failure in M&A deals? 
c) What risks were associated with the Saambou First Rand acquisition deal? 
Response: 
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In terms of the respondents perceptions about issues pertaining to risks, the prevailing 
overall view was that, risks are drawn from a broader perspective of the business, which 
involves the financial risks associated with the capital restructuring of the Group's 
balance sheet after M&A transaction, which results in amendments in gearing and 
working capital structures as a result of the deal, also, from an operational 
perspective, the value in use for determining future financial performance upon which 
valuation is based, can be impaired by risks of operational nature which involves risks 
from wide range of factors like marketing, legal and regulatory issues which may not suit 
the business moving forward into the future, human resources mismanagement and 
others. 
The whole aim of due diligence is to focus on the above wide range of issues, analyse 
them and suggest strategies for incorporation into the post-integration business plan, 
which also must be used to decide on value for the acquisition. 
The respondents view about the risks associated with Saambou acquisition were that, 
the acquisition was driven by market factors to acquire opportunities that were availed to 
smaller banks by the government to financing of lower income housing schemes, which 
larger banking groups were not introduced to. However, the interest was on market 
expansion, and overlooking the inherent governance problems and capital structure 
inefficiencies within Saambou, of which were not assigned strategies in the post 
acquisition business plan by the First Rand Limited. 
Hence, the bank was forced into curatorship upon the inherent inefficiencies being 
exposed to public, and with few large corporate clients withdrawing their deposits, this 
attracted negative market sentiments resulting in other depositors withdrawals and within 
little time leaving the bank illiquid, due to its inherent non-optimal capital structure. 
Question 3: 
What are the essential elements required to develop an effective strategic plan to cover 
post-acquisition business operations? 
Response: 
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The respondents view was that, the objective/s that motivated the M&A deal should be 
adequately addressed in the strategic plan following the acquisition. There should be 
strategic initiatives covering the main objective/s for the acquisition, these should be 
tested for feasibility and be measurable against the plans. Budgets and financial 
projections for such strategies should be evaluated against the deal, prior to making an 
acquisition, in order to ensure that the acquisition price covers all factors to the business 
plan. 
Question 4: 
What lessons can be learned in a deal whereby the acquisition has failed to deliver the 
expected synergies, such as the Saambou deal? 
Response: 
There are various lessons to be learned, amongst them, is that, companies do not 
acquire others for the sake of utilizing their surplus cash resources to acquire market 
opportunities under which their investment decisions were not properly evaluated, and 
post-acquisition business plans not detailed to address key inherent operational 
inefficiencies. 
Due diligence should not be taken for granted, but must be followed strictly to address all 
levels of operations of both strategic and operational nature, with quantification of the 
financial impact of such operations, including development of post integration strategies 
for their management. 
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Chapter 6: Recommendations and Conclusion 
6.1 Summary of major results 
This research was basically intended at sensitizing corporate bodies about the 
investment risks inherent from embarking on a merger and acquisition deal. The 
inherent facts from the above case, have been interpreted and evaluated using 
Porter's Five Market Forces model, SWOT and PEST analysis. 
The main weaknesses exposed from Saambou bank, which the acquirer, First Rand 
Group failed to manage, as a result of its lack of post-acquisition strategy which did 
not embrace post -acquisition synergies from the deal are as follows: 
• Poor governance procedures, including the non-compliance to the Bank's 
Usury Act procedures for charging interest on customer accounts. This to a 
larger extent tainted the bank's image and customer service reputation. 
• Risk management was a key factor that led to the bank's failure. The inherent 
liquidity risk from imbalanced numbers in the level of customer deposits to 
borrowings given by the bank, resulted in the one major customer (Investec) 
deposit withdrawal of R1bn as a result of negative sentiments drawn by the 
market from inherent management inefficiencies, leading to the rest of the 
customers withdrawing their deposits to render the bank illiquid. 
• The reason for the acquisition, which was driven from First Rand Group's 
perspective of taking advantage of the market opportunity of government's 
low income subsidy housing scheme loaned to employees via Saambou 
bank, was not properly risk managed to justify viable returns. 
M&A involve a process that must be followed consequentially to ensure that no 
stones are left unturned in evaluating a deal, as omission of some evaluation factors 
could render the transaction fruitless, as the companies could transact on wrong or 
67 
incomplete elements of the deal, which do not portray the true value of the deal in its 
present value context, and value moving forward inherent in the post acquisition 
strategies. 
Important motivators for M&A, which must be aimed at being achieved by the post 
acquisition strategy to make the transaction a future success, are as follows, as per 
Correiaefa/., (1993:666). 
• Increase future returns through economies of scale 
• Bring product and service diversity to embark or dominate new and existing 
market segments (increase market share) 
• Optimize competition, cost structure and enhance quality and efficiency - (via 
increased operating volumes and capacity, and by acquiring target company 
reputable management skills) 
• Tax considerations including taking account of assessed tax losses of the 
target company with potential returns to avoid exposure to Corporate tax on 
current profits of the acquiring entity. 
The first three reasons which influence corporate acquisitions, appears not to have been 
given enough attention on the post-acquisition strategy for First Rand acquisition of 
Saambou bank, as in overall it implies that the status quo was the case even after 
acquisition. There appears to have been no or not significant post -acquisition change 
management process within the acquired bank to drive new strategy. 
Hence, the above factors, if read in conjunction with the facts inherent in the above 
Saambou bank's case, its evaluation and theory study above, will give useful insight 
information to companies intending to embark on M&A deals, and to Investment Bankers 
undertaking an advisory role in M&A deals to their clients, on what elements to look for 
in planning for an M&A, and in drawing up a post-M&A strategy for embracing synergies 
for the new business. 
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6.2 Recommendations (Process and approach) 
This covers, amongst other factors, things that must be considered by potential buyers 
before signing off on an M&A deal, 
• Compliance to Regulatory issues that must be covered in a deal, including 
regulatory aspects of the Bank's Usury Act and the Public Finance Management 
Act (PFMA). 
• Planning for risk management processes. As part of due diligence process, 
current and potential risks should be identified, and risk management policies 
embedded in the post acquisition strategy. An example, was the imbalanced 
timing of liabilities (deposits of short-term nature) used to finance assets (of 
medium to long-term nature), which resulted in problems of liquidity when 
customers withdrew savings. Hence, there was a need to plan for the 
restructuring of the Balance Sheet, as part of the post acquisition strategy for 
Saambou bank. 
• With reference to a summary of Sahakian's due diligence checklist, from 
Woodbridge Group - M&A specialists who are leading middle market investment 
banking firm, the key factors to note and cover within the due diligence exercise 
are as follows, the identification of risk factors pertinent to the business, 
strategies to manage risk as part of the post acquisition business plan, build in 
the cost of managing risk in future business as part of the valuation exercise for 
the acquired or merged entity, and the strategy implementation plan thereof. 
6.3 Conclusion 
Based on the limitations inherent from the project, the following conclusions can be 
drawn: 
Overlooking the inherent inefficiencies of the target company, resulted in First Rand 
Limited continuing to overcharge customers for interest, which amounted to a 
transgression of governance procedures prescribed by the Bank's Usury Act. 
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Lack of efficient and effective management skills of the acquired bank, which ultimately 
led to systems and control inefficiencies, i.e. below, a statement made by Saambou 
CEO to this effect. 
"Thank God we were so naive about what was needed to run a bank," begins Christo 
Davel, CEO of Saambou. 
Considering that he launched a bank in 18 months, found himself less than seven 
months later at the wrong end of a curatorship that wasn't his fault, kept the bank all 
dressed up with nowhere to go for another 18 months, and has had to rebuild the bank 
almost from scratch in the past year, this admission by the bank's CEO is stunning. 
Also, operating inefficiencies inherent from the bad implementation of a Canadian 
operating software system called Twenty 20, which was not well implemented, had no 
post implementation follow up budget to address implementation problems, and with no 
adequate Service Provider back up support in South Africa. 
Financial risk of the bank's capital base residing on a few large corporate depositors, 
which in the case of withdrawing their funds, the business effectively becomes illiquid, 
and subject to curatorship. I.e. R1bn withdrawal of Investec deposit from saambou, 
called the shots for the bank's curatorship. 
6.4 Summary 
Due to the fact that most corporate expansions are facilitated through mergers and 
acquisitions, more than is the case internal expansion for investment on capital projects, 
it becomes evident that the South African economy is more reliant on mergers and 
acquisitions for enhancing more economic activity at corporate level and in ensuring that 
employment levels are retained or increased, also rendering more state revenues by 
way of taxes from the increased returns based on inherent synergies from successful 
outcome of mergers and acquisitions. 
While at macro level, this helps attract foreign investment and capital needed for 
economic growth in this country. 
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In the foregoing, it is therefore evident that successful outcome of mergers and 
acquisitions can lead to industrial and economic growth. 
This research study is therefore intended to formulate logical steps and approach for 
optimizing due diligence in order to facilitate prudent investment decisions and 




Appendix 1 - Interview Questionnaire 
Question 1 : 
Describe the key elements motivating M&A activity in industry? 
Question 2: 
What are the risks involved in corporate M&A deals? 
Sub questions 
d) What are the financial risks associated with poor planning for deciding on 
a deal for acquisition and mergers? 
e) From a post acquisition perspective, what are the critical common 
operating risk factors leading to failure in M&A deals? 
f) What risks were associated with the Saambou First Rand acquisition 
deal? 
Question 3: 
What are the essential elements required to develop an effective strategic plan to 
cover post-acquisition business operations? 
Question 4: 
What lessons can be learned in a deal whereby the acquisition has failed to 
deliver the expected synergies? 
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Appendix 2 - Capital Alliance - Review of Operations 
The relevant text referred to in the Literature review, provides an emphasis to inherent 
synergies common in acquisitions, mergers and integration of business activity. This is 
portrayed inherent synergies in Capital Alliance review of Operations, referred to in the 
Appendix below. Accessed on the website for http//www.msn.search/Capital 
Alliance/Review of Operations.htm. 
OVERVIEW 
During the period under review, the group focused on the following areas: 
• Integrating the Fedlife policy data onto the Capital Alliance Life operational 
platform; 
• The concluding acquisitions of life insurance companies. This was achieved with 
the acquisition of Saambou Life, effective 1 November 2002 (after all regulatory 
approvals were obtained): 
• Increasing the base of policies administered, achieved with the reinsurance and 
administration of the IEB pensions annuity book, effective 30 September 2002; 
• The managing of expenses, persistency, mortality, morbidity and investment 
returns (which are the main embedded value drivers) in order to maximise the 
operating profits in the year and the present value of future profits on the in force 
business; 
• Providing distribution partners with products that demonstrate attractive value 
propositions and grow the group's policy base by means of new business 
(merger); and 
• Continued improvement in new business activities undertaken on the Capital 
Alliance brand, being group risk business written by the Corporate Risk Solutions 
division and individual life business written by the Capital Alliance Life 
Commercial division. 
The above activities are considered critical in achieving the group's stated objectives of: 
• Enhancing customer service; 
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• Reinforcing the culture of cost effectiveness (derived through economies of scale 
benefits that motivate merger and acquisition deals); and 
• Growing embedded value, through optimization of risks inherent from variables 
outside the key objectives driving a merger and acquisition deal i.e. post 
acquisition strategy and Group policy formulation on prevention and minimization 
of mortality rates to avoid increased level of claims, optimize future cash flows, 
and to enhance future new business returns to outperform historical returns in 
obtaining M&A synergies. 
Lack of post-acquisition strategic focus on securing values inherent from the new 
business led to the post acquisition downfall of Saambou bank. First Rand's lack of 
focus in coming up with a competitive strategy to secure customer deposits from future 
competitive withdrawals, and lack of focus in building customer confidence and 
reputable brand name for the bank in all its service streams resulted in portrayal of non-
confidence on the bank by customers, and sudden continual stream of deposit 
withdrawals which left the bank illiquid. 
As a consequence of the reinsurance transactions concluded during the 2002 and 2003 
financial years and the acquisition of Saambou Life, the group's activities are now 
primarily life insurance related and hence this review focuses on its life insurance 
activities. 
Also, no proper restructuring and reorganization of activities was done subsequent to the 
Saambou acquisition. Implying that, there was no rightsizing and streamlining of services 
to allow the new business to focus only on risk controlled and value add activities across 
all service range. Hence, risk based service offerings which had no post acquisition 
strategic approach, led to the overall failure of the bank, despite inherent business 
opportunities like low income government driven housing loans offered by the bank. 
The Capital Alliance group has a number of other investments, mainly the 30,83% 
interest in Nova Group Holdings Limited, a company active in both life and non-life cell 
captive insurance and an effective 39% interest in Prefsure Life Limited ("Prefsure Life"), 
an Australian life insurance company. Both of these investments performed well in the 
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year and are on track to deliver the shareholder return objectives set at the time of the 
original investment. 
CAPITAL ALLIANCE LIFE 
Capital Alliance Life had a good year, characterised by: 
• the completion of the Fedlife integration projects onto the Capital Alliance Life 
operations engine ahead of time and within budget 
• the acquisition of Saambou Life and subsequent integration of the policy book 
onto the Capital Alliance Life operational platform; 
• the conclusion of the IEB annuity reinsurance transaction and subsequent 
integration of the annuities in payment onto the Capital Alliance Life operational 
platform; 
• further enhancement of client service levels; 
• achievement of planned renewal cost savings; 
• a substantial increase in the embedded value of new business; 
• good persistency in respect of the in force business and retention of new 
business written; 
• a relatively good investment result in a weak investment period; and meaningful 
progress in the transformation of the company in terms of the group's 
empowerment strategy. 
A) Service levels 
The conclusion of the integration projects listed above gave rise to substantial cost 
savings, which in turn led to increased profits in the year and enhanced the value of 
business. They also allowed the group to offer enhanced service to clients. Service 
level turnaround times were shortened in order to deal with queries more quickly and 
more efficiently. Table 1.1 below indicates the improvement in both Service Level 
Agreements ("SLA's") and achievement of SLA's for Fedlife clients: 
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Please note the following: 
• The information for August 2001 is prior to the reinsurance and administration 
agreement i.e. indicates SLA's provided by Fedlife to clients; 
• The information for May 2002 indicates the improvements brought about by the 
group prior to the integration; and 
• The information for May 2003 is after the conversion of the Fedlife data onto the 
Capital Alliance Life operations engine. 
The improvement in service levels is also evident when looking at the number of 
outstanding work items in queues over the period January 2001 to January 2003 as 
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reflected in Graph 1 below (note that the increase in client service items in June 2002 
was due to pre-conversion clean ups): 
Graph 1: Work items in queues 
Work items in queues 






The group was invited to enter the "Call Centre of the year" competition run for banks, 
insurers and other financial services companies and was pleased to be placed 5th 
against a very competitive field. The improvement in service delivered by the call centre 





Table 2: Improvement Call Centre statistics 
Item 
Service level (80% answered in 45 seconds) 
Average queue time 
Incoming calls 
Abandoned calls 
Average talk time 






















In order to further improve service delivered to policyholders a new range of maturity 
extension products was launched. These products offer clients with maturing funds, who 
do not require immediate use of these funds, a secure, tax efficient and low cost vehicle 
in which to house their matured policies until they require the funds. This product range 
has been branded the "Future Select Capitaliser" and has achieved a good level of 
acceptance in the short period since launch. 
B) Optimization of Expense management 
As a consequence of the completion of the various integration projects, which reduced 
overall costs and increased the volume of policies administered, the group managed 
further reductions in per policy costs for Fedlife. The per policy costs for Capital Alliance 
Life increased in line with the valuation assumptions, as can be seen from Graph 2 
below: 
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1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Years 
H New business 
n CAL renewal 
• Fed renewal 
Please note the following: 
• Figures are given in nominal amounts per year i.e. comparatives are not adjusted 
to compensate for inflation. In real terms unit costs have reduced in most periods 
and; 
• The Capital Alliance Life renewal costs over the year were affected by the 
termination of a block of 50 000 policies. Had this termination not occurred the 
cost per policy would have remained constant in nominal terms from 2002 to 
2003. 
The group remains on track to achieve further cost savings during the course of the 
2004 financial year. 
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